The Trump administration is launching a new phase of tariff policy in which economic calculation is closely intertwined with geopolitical pressure. The threat of an additional 10% tariff for countries cooperating with BRICS, ultimatums to allies, changing terms 'on the fly,' and the desire to conclude dozens of deals in a matter of days—all this transforms the U.S. foreign economic course into a dynamic but extremely contradictory construct. At the core of the strategy is the idea that tariffs can simultaneously stimulate domestic industry, replenish the budget, reduce the trade deficit, and serve as a lever of diplomatic pressure. However, in practice, these goals often conflict with one another, and the longer the tariff campaign lasts, the more apparent its internal contradictions become.
A new wave of tariff pressure is developing against the backdrop of open confrontation with the BRICS alliance, which has expanded to twelve countries and is openly challenging the Western monetary-financial architecture. Trump stated explicitly: any country siding with BRICS against the U.S. will face additional tariffs without exception. Essentially, this is no longer just about protecting American production, but about trying to impose foreign policy loyalty through economic pressure. This marks a radical departure from the previous model of global trade, where multilateralism and rules took center stage, not ultimatums.
Nevertheless, despite the rigidity and expansiveness of the approach, it cannot be denied that in the short term, it sometimes yields results. Some countries have made concessions following tariff threats. An example is Canada’s abandonment of the digital tax, partial tariff reductions from China, and agreements with Vietnam and the UK. These cases show that tariffs can indeed work as a lever of pressure, especially when it comes to urgent and limited issues. The U.S. trade deficit sharply decreased by almost half in April, marking the most significant achievement in this direction. Although this effect is likely more related to a temporary 'shock' for companies and supply chains than to a systemic reorientation of imports and exports, the very fact demonstrates that short-term goals can be achieved with tariffs.
Furthermore, there have been statements from large companies about their intentions to invest in production within the U.S. GE Appliances, Apple, General Motors, and others have announced plans to create or expand production capacities. Although most of these decisions were made before the new tariffs or are not directly related to them, it cannot be ruled out that tariff pressure played a catalytic role—intensifying already existing trends towards localization. At least at the level of public discourse, Trump has once again made industrial policy the number one topic.
However, behind individual successes lie fundamental contradictions. Building new factories takes years, and the shortage of skilled labor remains a chronic problem. The U.S. industry openly has over 400,000 job vacancies, while high labor costs make American goods less competitive. As experts note, if the iPhone were produced entirely in the U.S., its cost would exceed $3,000—an unacceptable level for a mass product. Moreover, with each 'returned' production, the U.S. loses revenue from import duties: domestically produced goods are not subject to tariffs, and the budget misses out on funds that previously came from foreign supplies.
The fiscal expectations of the administration are also far from realistic assessments. Trump claimed that tariffs could completely replace the federal income tax. In practice, economists estimate that this would require rates of 100–200% on all imports, which would lead to a catastrophic drop in consumer demand. Currently, the total amount of tariffs collected since the beginning of the campaign is less than $100 billion, while income from income tax exceeds $3 trillion per year. Even in peak months, tariffs brought in no more than $20 billion. Thus, tariffs in their current form cannot serve as a full source of fiscal stability.
The weak point of the policy also lies in the negotiation deadlines. Despite the statement about '200 deals,' only three have been concluded—with the UK, Vietnam, and partially with China. The deadline of July 9 for signing contracts has essentially failed, and the administration is shifting the deadlines to August. Letters notifying countries of new tariffs will be sent in the coming days. But even this is not a final point, but merely a continuation of maneuvers where tactics substitute for strategy.
The context within the American economy itself increasingly works against tariff escalation. Despite the rise in the stock market and some improvement in consumer expectations, real household spending is declining, inflation is beginning to gain momentum, and industrial employment has fallen for the second consecutive month. Retail sales data indicate a cooling of demand. In such circumstances, further escalation of tariff aggression could undermine economic recovery and trigger a recession—especially if a retaliatory wave of tariffs follows from partner countries.
One of the possible hidden goals of Trump's tariff strategy is not only to change the terms of trade but also to restructure the very architecture of global interaction. Through constant deadline extensions, alternating threats and concessions, Trump creates a regime of controlled uncertainty in which previous multilateral mechanisms lose their effectiveness. Such an atmosphere significantly complicates coordination among countries and weakens the capacity for collective resistance to American pressure. The global block trade model is being replaced by a strictly bilateral deals model—under threat, under individual terms, in a manual control mode.
In this context, uncertainty is not a mistake but a conscious tactic aimed at fragmenting a unified front and forcing countries to negotiate exclusively with the U.S. This translates trade into the realm of personal agreements, where Trump, as the chief negotiator, feels comfortable. He turns global trade into a series of personal 'deals of the century,' undermining institutional mechanisms and replacing them with a subjective system of 'those with us win, those against us will be taxed.' Thus, tariffs become not so much an economic tool as a geopolitical instrument for reshaping the world according to the logic of transactional superiority.
Against the backdrop of a global shift—the strengthening of BRICS, the rise of dedollarization, discussions of a new monetary architecture—tariffs are becoming not just an economic but a symbolic weapon. The problem is that this weapon is too blunt for fine-tuning. It exerts pressure but is poorly suited for building sustainable economic models. Each success in negotiations nullifies the tariff leverage. Every concession on tariffs reduces revenues. And every threat creates an expectation that the rules can change at any moment.
And yet it must be acknowledged: Trump managed to restart the discussion of fundamental distortions in global trade. Questions of deficits, dependence on imports, industrial degradation, and the fairness of benefit distribution from globalization have once again taken center stage in political discourse. Even if the methods remain controversial, the mere shift towards a conversation about production, tariffs, and strategic autonomy has become an important shift. However, addressing these issues with pinpoint strikes on dozens of countries simultaneously is a path to system overload. The main risk is that relying on tariffs as a universal answer may lead not to the resolution of problems but to their accumulation in an even more acute form. In trying to simultaneously fix the trade balance, replenish the budget, launch reindustrialization, and punish opponents, the White House may overlook the main thing—stability, predictability, and trust as the basis for long-term economic growth.