This controversy around OUSD has exposed a major issue: the credit boundary was breached before the product was even officially launched.
Credit canโt be built up by a list of namesโespecially when that list contains โwater.โ
What people care about now isnโt how widely its future distribution channels might expand, but how much โwaterโ is still in that list.
This morning I saw Upbit @Official_Upbit also take a stance: it will not participate in the issuance of OUSD.
This is basically the Korean market-level equivalent of hitting the pause button on OUSD.
But actually, OUSDโs direction isnโt the problem. It even targets the core pain points of the stablecoin business model.
In the past, many stablecoins were like:
โI issue, you use, and I take the reserve yield.โ
What OUSD is trying to say is:
โLetโs distribute together, govern together, and share the yields together.โ
In its Open Standard narrative, OUSD emphasizes several things: zero minting/redemption fees, no size limits, reserve yield allocated to participating enterprises, open governance, and enterprise-focused payments and settlement.
Thatโs not exactly without appeal.
But the problem is here too
#OUSD The most important thing this โalliance-styleโ stablecoin model needs to prove isnโt โI know a lot of big companies,โ but rather โwhat exactly have these companies actually committed to?โ
In this controversy, multiple Korean companies stated they had not officially agreed to joinโonly that they were in contact or evaluation stages.
Thatโs when the credit boundary was effectively broken.
Whether they will participate in the future is one matter, but the pre-announced list clearly contains โwater.โ
That is a credit issue.
In this alliance model, the โpartnershipโ canโt be vague.
Whether they have formally signed, whether they participate in governance, and whether they participate in distribution after issuance are completely different identities.
If everyone is lumped into a single โalliance listโ and presented that way, it may get attention in the short term, but will backfire in the long run.
Because stablecoins arenโt narrative assetsโtheyโre credit assets.
And credit itself is also part of the moat.
When regular projects brag about partnerships, at most it affects TVL and the coin price.
When stablecoins brag about partnerships, it affects usersโ judgments about reserves, redemptions, compliance, clearing, and systemic risk.
These are two different dimensions.
I think the real value of this event isnโt deciding whether OUSD is โdead.โ
Instead, it has exposed in advance several key issues that an โalliance-styleโ stablecoin must clearly define and resolve:
Who truly signed?
Who participates in governance?
Who bears the primary responsibility?
Who truly participates in the post-issuance distribution?
Without those answers, no matter how long the list is, itโs still just a list.