Quantum computers are unlikely to pose a threat to Bitcoin in the foreseeable future. This opinion was expressed by the co-founder of Casa, Jameson Lopp.
His statement came against the backdrop of increasing discussions about whether progress in quantum computing could compromise the cryptographic systems of blockchains.
Divergence of expert opinions on the timelines for technological breakthroughs
In a recent post on social media platform X, Jameson Lopp emphasized that quantum technologies will not be able to break Bitcoin in the near future. The author highlighted the need to monitor the evolution of systems. According to him, the industry should hope for the best but prepare in advance for negative scenarios.
Lopp's position aligns with the opinions of many specialists who do not see immediate risks for the network. Adam Back, CEO of Blockstream, called the likelihood of such threats materializing in the short term negligible. He believes that practical applications of technologies are decades away. The reason lies in significant challenges in conducting applied physical research.
A similar viewpoint is held by Cardano founder Charles Hoskinson. He asserts that current concerns regarding the security of blockchains are exaggerated. Hoskinson also noted that transitioning to new encryption will lead to significant losses in system efficiency.
However, some experts believe that the timelines for the emergence of threats are shortening. David Carvalho, CEO of Naoris Protocol, warned about the possible compromise of Bitcoin's security within the next 2–3 years.
A researcher from the University of Waterloo, Michele Mosca, estimates the probability of breaking fundamental cryptography by 2026 as 1 in 7. On the forecasting platform Metaculus, the date for a potential RSA encryption breach has shifted from 2052 to 2034. The 'Quantum Apocalypse Clock' project indicates an even more radical date — March 8, 2028.
Challenges of implementing quantum protection in the Bitcoin protocol
Experts agree that implementing protective measures will require a long time. Jameson Lopp noted that migrating to post-quantum standards could take between 5 to 10 years. When discussing risks, attention is more often focused on Bitcoin rather than traditional banks, due to the different speeds of system adaptation.
Traditional financial institutions can update their structures several orders of magnitude faster than the Bitcoin ecosystem. For the banking sector, the transition process is relatively straightforward. When standards change, organizations can centrally implement new algorithms and forcefully update user credentials.
In contrast to them, Bitcoin lacks a central governing body. Any change to the signature algorithms requires broad social consensus and voluntary participation from users. This makes the coordination process extremely complex.
Technical limitations further complicate the task. Lost or inactive wallets will not be able to undergo the migration process. Consequently, part of the issuance will remain permanently vulnerable to attacks. Most post-quantum signature schemes have significantly larger key sizes. In a system with strict block size limits, this creates serious scalability issues for the entire network.
Thus, decentralization provides resilience to Bitcoin but simultaneously slows its adaptation to new technological challenges.
