Bertie Cavalero Ec4h

Why Did the United States Turn Its Back on the Kurds?
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‎ Is Syria’s Long Civil War Finally Nearing an End?
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‎On January 20, the Syrian government announced a fresh ceasefire agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Prior to this deal, government troops had already regained control over large parts of the country. If implemented fully, the agreement would return much of eastern Syria to Damascus’s authority and integrate SDF fighters into the Syrian army.
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‎How this arrangement will work in practice remains uncertain. Still, the agreement signals a major turning point: the collapse of the SDF’s political position and the likely end of nearly 14 years of Kurdish self-rule in northeastern Syria. Under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, this marks the first time since 2012 that the Damascus government has re-established control over such a vast territory. Crucially, however, this shift did not originate in Syria—it came from Washington.
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‎Since its formation in 2015 with US backing, the SDF viewed itself as a protected ally of the United States. It played a central role in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and was Washington’s primary partner on the ground. But quietly, the US has changed course.
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‎Following a meeting between President Donald Trump and Ahmed al-Sharaa in November last year, Syria joined the US-led coalition against ISIS. With this development, the SDF’s strategic value to Washington sharply declined. As a result, when al-Sharaa’s forces moved toward SDF-held areas, US approval—or at least acquiescence—came as little surprise.
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‎### Washington Steps Back
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‎On January 20, US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack stated that the SDF’s role as the main on-the-ground force against ISIS had largely come to an end. Many Kurds and SDF leaders see this stance as an open betrayal.
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‎SDF commander Mazloum Abdi strongly criticized Barrack’s comments, accusing him of abandoning earlier assurances. According to Abdi, previous promises included Kurdish self-administration in Kurdish-majority regions and the continued presence of certain SDF units to ensure security—commitments he says Washington has now withdrawn.
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‎This shift is not new for the Trump administration. During his first term, Trump twice signaled plans to abandon the SDF. In December 2018, after declaring ISIS defeated, he announced the withdrawal of more than 2,000 US troops from eastern Syria, leaving the SDF facing severe uncertainty. That decision was later reversed following intervention by then National Security Adviser John Bolton.
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‎In October 2019, Trump again ordered the withdrawal of nearly 1,000 troops. At the same time, Turkey launched attacks on SDF positions near Tal Abyad. Trump was once more forced to reconsider after opposition from the Pentagon, which feared that fully abandoning the SDF would benefit Russia and its ally, then-President Bashar al-Assad. During that period, Abdi even explored cooperation with Assad as an alternative shield against Turkey.
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‎### Fewer Obstacles This Time
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‎Trump’s core position has remained consistent: he favors pulling US forces out of Syria. Tom Barrack has reiterated that Washington has no interest in maintaining a long-term military presence there.
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‎Unlike in 2018 or 2019, Trump now faces fewer internal constraints. His position in US domestic politics is stronger, and opposition from the Pentagon or national security officials has weakened. Assad has been removed from power, and Russia’s influence in Syria has diminished. As a result, fears that US rivals would benefit from abandoning the SDF are now less pronounced.
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‎Moreover, Washington appears more comfortable working with Ahmed al-Sharaa, who presents himself as the leading partner in the fight against ISIS. From the US perspective, Sharaa represents a recognized state authority, while the SDF remains a non-state actor. Additionally, a key US ally, Turkey, considers the SDF a terrorist organization.
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‎This policy shift may trigger criticism—abandoning allies rarely sends a positive signal. But such concerns have never weighed heavily on Trump’s decision-making.
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‎### A Repeated Pattern of Betrayal
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‎What is happening to Syria’s Kurds is not an isolated case. It is the latest example in a long history of Kurdish reliance on, and abandonment by, the United States.
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‎In 2017, after Iraqi Kurds held an independence referendum, Baghdad moved to retake Kirkuk. The Trump administration offered no meaningful support to its Kurdish allies. Earlier, in 1991, President George H. W. Bush encouraged Iraqi Kurds and Shiites to rise against Saddam Hussein, but Washington failed to provide the expected military backing, allowing Baghdad to crush the uprising. Only later did Western powers establish a protected Kurdish autonomous zone.
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‎Going further back, in 1975, the US secretly supported Iraqi Kurdish rebels against Baghdad as part of its alliance with Iran’s Shah. Once Iran and Iraq signed a peace agreement, Washington abruptly withdrew support, leaving the Kurds exposed to brutal repression.
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‎As the sense of defeat settles in, Mazloum Abdi and other SDF leaders may come to recognize how much of a strategic mistake it was to place their trust in the United States. Given past betrayals and more recent events—such as the Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan—many argue that relying on Trump was always a risky gamble.
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‎In fact, as early as 2018, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned the SDF: “You never know when the United States will sell you out.”
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‎### Few Alternatives Ahead
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‎The SDF understands that, like all Kurdish movements seeking autonomy or independence, it has always operated from a position of weakness. The four states that surround Kurdish-majority regions—Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—are all opposed to Kurdish independence and have repeatedly acted to suppress Kurdish self-rule.
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‎This reality has pushed Kurdish nationalists to depend on external powers such as the United States, and at times Israel. But the Syrian experience has shown how dangerous that reliance can be. External priorities can change overnight, increasing the risk of abandonment. Still, given their fragile strategic position, Kurds have very limited alternatives.
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‎This chapter of Kurdish autonomy in Syria may be nearing its end. Yet history suggests that if the US or another major power once again needs Kurdish fighters for broader strategic goals—whether in Syria or elsewhere—a new chapter could begin. The lingering fear remains that the familiar cycle will repeat itself: support first, abandonment later.$