527—Lawliet
1.6k Posts
527—Lawliet
🔸 币圈最帅的律师
🔸 在稳定币、RWA、DAT里挖掘财富密码
🔸 波浪理论信徒
Open Trade
ETH Holder
High-Frequency Trader
5.6 Years
8 Following
45 Followers
45 Liked
Posts
Portfolio
Over the past two weeks, in all 3 Space rooms, I’ve said one thing:
If you want to understand the current market, you first need to understand the 519 from 2021.
Right here, right now—whether it’s stocks or crypto, it’s just like it was back then.
1/ What exactly happened on May 19, 2021?
Let’s start with the background.
That bull market in 2021 was, in essence, a leveraged bull driven by central banks flooding the system with liquidity after the COVID-19 pandemic. But at the same time, it was also the first true cycle when DeFi became the main storyline of the market.
BTC and ETH, carrying a bunch of core DeFi coins, surged hard.
Pretty much every exchange listed DeFi coins on its own.
Storage mining coins—like CHIA and FIL—were all the rage.
ETH, BSC, and Tron basically ran in sync on three fronts.
From November 2020 to May 2021, the market barely experienced any major pullbacks.
But that week of 519 was the turning point of the entire bull market.
BTC dumped from $59,600 to $31,300.
ETH was slashed from $4,300 straight down to $2,200.
700,000 people were liquidated.
Total on-network derivatives OI dropped by 60% overnight.
This was a real, violent deleveraging.
2/ What was the trigger for 519?
519 itself wasn’t caused by a single event—it was a forced liquidation triggered by a chain of events.
On the macro side, starting in May there were increasing voices questioning rising inflation and the idea that U.S. economic growth had peaked.
On 5/12, the previous round’s strongest trade-forcaster, Elon Musk, announced that Tesla would pause accepting BTC payments.
On 5/13, Binance was reported by the media to be under DOJ/IRS investigation.
On 5/18, three major Chinese industry associations—the China Banking Association, the Payment and Clearing Association, and the Internet Finance Association—issued a joint statement reaffirming that financial institutions and payment institutions must not provide crypto-related services.
Note: this wasn’t the so-called “seven ministries jointly,” but rather an industry document from three associations. However, at that time the market was already fragile enough that such a policy signal was enough to ignite things.
On 5/21, China’s State Council Financial Commission further made it explicit: crack down on BTC mining and trading activities.
At the same time, things weren’t quiet on-chain either.
Venus Protocol had a massive liquidation and bad-debt incident. My impression is that this was one of the largest protocol bad debts in DeFi history at the time.
This series of events precisely hit the market’s main storyline back then:
BTC, ETH, exchange leverage, DeFi, BSC farms, and all the high-beta offshoots they had branched out into.
The transmission path was very clear:
Spot BTC/ETH falls
→ collateral value drops
→ CEX contract liquidations
→ DeFi lending liquidations
→ liquidity mining blows up
→ offshoots lose their buyers
519 wasn’t “just a drop.”
519 was direct liquidation overnight, followed by a continuous free-fall.
I remember it especially vividly because that day I was out at a dinner gathering, got a stomach bug, and in the bathroom I watched the cascade liquidations unfold on my phone the whole time.
Almost all exchanges went down.
Prices were smashed straight through by liquidation.
And the reality is: before all of this happened, there were already very clear expectations that upstream liquidity would destabilize.
3/ U.S. stocks 623—right here, right now, just like it was back then.
Two weeks ago, everyone who was shouting that AI/semiconductors in U.S. stocks were “building a better future for human civilization” went silent.
Just like in crypto five years ago.
That week, three things happened first:
The supply-chain pricing dispute between MU and Apple was brought to the surface;
Meta announced compute rental;
SK Hynix announced large-scale capacity expansion.
The external variable was the ambiguity in rate hikes and policy uncertainty after Wah (Wosh) came to power.
The result was also very familiar:
The main AI/semiconductor players nearly all dropped to near the lows of the monthly chart for the first time in months.
At first glance, it seems like it has nothing to do with 519.
But the logic is actually completely the same.
Uncertainty in the macro direction started to transmit upstream on the AI/semiconductor segmentation of the market, sending a signal that upstream liquidity was contracting.
Attacked: liquidity centers in BTC/exchanges/DeFi
vs
Reversed: CAPEX expectations that “scarcity makes it valuable”
At its core, it’s both a break in upstream liquidity expectations within a Ponzi-like structure.
That is:
Bet that big players / rapid ecosystem expansion in DeFi infrastructure
vs
Bet that CAPEX gets allocated first to the “bottleneck” segments
The theoretical foundations of both speculative expectations started to be broken.
Back then, big mining players had to go overseas.
Now, HBM giants have to expand capacity.
On the surface, these are all good news: more investment, expanded capacity, long-term growth.
But in terms of market structure, this is a typical signal that a scarce narrative has entered the CAPEX cycle.
Convert current high valuations into new supply;
Use new supply commitments to promise future growth;
Use future growth to justify today’s high valuation.
That’s the classic segmentation-market logic.
When upstream thinks something is “expensive,” it means it no longer feels “urgent.”
The bottleneck premium disappears.
Because they’re literally piping in and plugging the demand with external supply—going straight for it through increased production capacity.
When “supply scarcity” enters “supply response,” the narrative premium will start to revert to the valuation framework of periodic commodity-like cycles.
Just like back then when everyone started realizing that liquidity mining couldn’t run anymore.
APY proved demand had failed.
CAPEX proved demand was being challenged.
The only difference is:
519 was an immediate liquidation.
623 is a relatively slow repricing.
4/ More importantly, later on, what happened was...
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
If you want to understand the current market, you first need to understand the 519 from 2021.
Right here, right now—whether it’s stocks or crypto, it’s just like it was back then.
1/ What exactly happened on May 19, 2021?
Let’s start with the background.
That bull market in 2021 was, in essence, a leveraged bull driven by central banks flooding the system with liquidity after the COVID-19 pandemic. But at the same time, it was also the first true cycle when DeFi became the main storyline of the market.
BTC and ETH, carrying a bunch of core DeFi coins, surged hard.
Pretty much every exchange listed DeFi coins on its own.
Storage mining coins—like CHIA and FIL—were all the rage.
ETH, BSC, and Tron basically ran in sync on three fronts.
From November 2020 to May 2021, the market barely experienced any major pullbacks.
But that week of 519 was the turning point of the entire bull market.
BTC dumped from $59,600 to $31,300.
ETH was slashed from $4,300 straight down to $2,200.
700,000 people were liquidated.
Total on-network derivatives OI dropped by 60% overnight.
This was a real, violent deleveraging.
2/ What was the trigger for 519?
519 itself wasn’t caused by a single event—it was a forced liquidation triggered by a chain of events.
On the macro side, starting in May there were increasing voices questioning rising inflation and the idea that U.S. economic growth had peaked.
On 5/12, the previous round’s strongest trade-forcaster, Elon Musk, announced that Tesla would pause accepting BTC payments.
On 5/13, Binance was reported by the media to be under DOJ/IRS investigation.
On 5/18, three major Chinese industry associations—the China Banking Association, the Payment and Clearing Association, and the Internet Finance Association—issued a joint statement reaffirming that financial institutions and payment institutions must not provide crypto-related services.
Note: this wasn’t the so-called “seven ministries jointly,” but rather an industry document from three associations. However, at that time the market was already fragile enough that such a policy signal was enough to ignite things.
On 5/21, China’s State Council Financial Commission further made it explicit: crack down on BTC mining and trading activities.
At the same time, things weren’t quiet on-chain either.
Venus Protocol had a massive liquidation and bad-debt incident. My impression is that this was one of the largest protocol bad debts in DeFi history at the time.
This series of events precisely hit the market’s main storyline back then:
BTC, ETH, exchange leverage, DeFi, BSC farms, and all the high-beta offshoots they had branched out into.
The transmission path was very clear:
Spot BTC/ETH falls
→ collateral value drops
→ CEX contract liquidations
→ DeFi lending liquidations
→ liquidity mining blows up
→ offshoots lose their buyers
519 wasn’t “just a drop.”
519 was direct liquidation overnight, followed by a continuous free-fall.
I remember it especially vividly because that day I was out at a dinner gathering, got a stomach bug, and in the bathroom I watched the cascade liquidations unfold on my phone the whole time.
Almost all exchanges went down.
Prices were smashed straight through by liquidation.
And the reality is: before all of this happened, there were already very clear expectations that upstream liquidity would destabilize.
3/ U.S. stocks 623—right here, right now, just like it was back then.
Two weeks ago, everyone who was shouting that AI/semiconductors in U.S. stocks were “building a better future for human civilization” went silent.
Just like in crypto five years ago.
That week, three things happened first:
The supply-chain pricing dispute between MU and Apple was brought to the surface;
Meta announced compute rental;
SK Hynix announced large-scale capacity expansion.
The external variable was the ambiguity in rate hikes and policy uncertainty after Wah (Wosh) came to power.
The result was also very familiar:
The main AI/semiconductor players nearly all dropped to near the lows of the monthly chart for the first time in months.
At first glance, it seems like it has nothing to do with 519.
But the logic is actually completely the same.
Uncertainty in the macro direction started to transmit upstream on the AI/semiconductor segmentation of the market, sending a signal that upstream liquidity was contracting.
Attacked: liquidity centers in BTC/exchanges/DeFi
vs
Reversed: CAPEX expectations that “scarcity makes it valuable”
At its core, it’s both a break in upstream liquidity expectations within a Ponzi-like structure.
That is:
Bet that big players / rapid ecosystem expansion in DeFi infrastructure
vs
Bet that CAPEX gets allocated first to the “bottleneck” segments
The theoretical foundations of both speculative expectations started to be broken.
Back then, big mining players had to go overseas.
Now, HBM giants have to expand capacity.
On the surface, these are all good news: more investment, expanded capacity, long-term growth.
But in terms of market structure, this is a typical signal that a scarce narrative has entered the CAPEX cycle.
Convert current high valuations into new supply;
Use new supply commitments to promise future growth;
Use future growth to justify today’s high valuation.
That’s the classic segmentation-market logic.
When upstream thinks something is “expensive,” it means it no longer feels “urgent.”
The bottleneck premium disappears.
Because they’re literally piping in and plugging the demand with external supply—going straight for it through increased production capacity.
When “supply scarcity” enters “supply response,” the narrative premium will start to revert to the valuation framework of periodic commodity-like cycles.
Just like back then when everyone started realizing that liquidity mining couldn’t run anymore.
APY proved demand had failed.
CAPEX proved demand was being challenged.
The only difference is:
519 was an immediate liquidation.
623 is a relatively slow repricing.
4/ More importantly, later on, what happened was...
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
In the past two weeks, in all 3 Space sessions, I said one thing:
If you want to understand the current market, you first need to understand the 519 from 2021.
Right here, right now—whether it’s stocks or crypto, it’s just like it was back then.
1/ What exactly happened on May 19, 2021?
Let’s start with the background.
That bull run in 2021, at its core, was a leveraged bull market caused by central banks around the world massively flooding the system with liquidity after the COVID-19 pandemic. But at the same time, it was also the first real cycle in which DeFi became the main market narrative.
BTC and ETH charged forward with a bunch of major core DeFi coins.
Most exchanges basically listed whatever DeFi coin they could.
Storage mining coins—like CHIA and FIL—were all the rage.
ETH, BSC, and Tron almost flew in a three-line sprint.
From November 2020 to May 2021, the market barely went through any significant pullbacks.
But that week of 519 was the turning point for the entire bull market.
BTC crashed from $59,600 down to $31,300.
ETH was slashed in half, from $4,300 straight down to $2,200.
700,000 people were liquidated.
Network-wide contract OI fell by 60% overnight.
This was a truly violent deleveraging.
2/ What was the trigger for 519?
519 itself wasn’t caused by a single event—it was a forced liquidation triggered by a chain of events.
On the macro side, starting in May, more and more voices began questioning rising inflation and the idea that U.S. economic growth had topped out.
On 5/12, the strongest trade-signal king from the previous cycle, Elon Musk, announced that Tesla would pause accepting BTC payments.
On 5/13, Binance was reported by the media to be under DOJ / IRS investigation.
On 5/18, three major associations in China—the China Banking Association, the Payment and Clearing Association, and the Internet Finance Association—issued statements reiterating that financial institutions and payment institutions must not provide crypto-related services.
Note: this wasn’t the so-called “joint statement by seven ministries.” It was an industry document from three associations. But at that time the market was already fragile enough that such a policy signal was enough to ignite everything.
On 5/21, the Financial Committee under China’s State Council further clarified the need to crack down on BTC mining and trading behavior.
At the same time, nothing stayed quiet on-chain.
Venus Protocol suffered massive liquidations and bad-debt events. If I remember correctly, this should have been one of the largest levels of protocol bad debt in DeFi history at the time.
This series of events precisely hit the main narrative of the market at that moment:
BTC, ETH, exchange leverage, DeFi, BSC farms, and all the high-beta offshoots they had expanded into.
The transmission path was extremely clear:
Underlying BTC / ETH drops
→ Collateral value falls
→ CEX contract liquidations
→ DeFi lending liquidations
→ Liquidity mining blows up
→ Offshoots lose their buyers
519 wasn’t “just a drop.”
519 was forced liquidations overnight, followed by a continuous crash.
I remember it especially vividly because that day I went out for a dinner get-together and got a stomachache; while in the bathroom, I watched the cascading liquidations unfold on my phone the whole time.
Almost every exchange went down.
Prices were basically smashed through by liquidations.
And the expectation of upstream liquidity instability was actually already very clear before it even happened.
3/ U.S. stocks, 623—right here, right now, just like it was back then.
Two weeks ago, everyone who was shouting that AI / semiconductors in the U.S. stock market were “betting on mankind’s civilization” went silent.
Just like in the crypto world five years ago.
That week, first, three things happened:
A supply-chain price dispute between MU and Apple came to the surface;
Meta announced it would rent out compute capacity;
SK Hynix announced large-scale capacity expansion.
The external variable was the ambiguity about rate hikes and policy uncertainty released after the new guy took office.
The outcome was also very familiar:
The leading AI / semiconductor names almost collectively dropped to near the lows of the monthly line for the first time in months.
At first glance, it seems like this has nothing to do with 519.
But the logic is completely the same.
Uncertainty in the macro direction started to propagate upstream on the split-position structures in AI / semiconductors, sending signals of upstream liquidity contraction.
When liquidity at the center of BTC / exchanges / DeFi was hit
vs
When expectations of CAPEX allocation of “scarcity commands a premium” were reversed
At its core, both are breaks in upstream liquidity expectations within a Ponzi-like structure.
In other words:
Bet on big players / fast expansion of DeFi infrastructure
vs
Bet on CAPEX being prioritized for “bottleneck” sectors
The theoretical foundations of both speculative expectations started to be broken.
Back then, big names in mining had to go overseas.
Now, HBM giants have to expand capacity.
On the surface, this looks like good news: more investment, more capacity, long-term growth.
But in terms of market structure, this is a classic signal that the scarcity narrative has entered the capital expenditure cycle.
Convert current overvaluation into new supply;
Use new supply commitments to support future growth;
Use future growth to justify today’s overvaluation.
That’s the typical logic of split-position structures.
When the upstream side feels “it’s expensive,” it means it no longer feels “urgent.”
The premium for bottlenecks disappears.
Because people can just route directly and install ECMO.
When “scarce supply” enters “supply response,” the narrative premium will start to revert to how the market values cycle commodities.
As people discovered back then: liquidity mining couldn’t be pushed any further.
APY proves that demand has collapsed.
CAPEX proves that demand is being challenged.
The only difference is:
519 was an immediate liquidation.
623 is a relatively slow repricing.
4/ More importantly, later what happened was...
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #blockchain
If you want to understand the current market, you first need to understand the 519 from 2021.
Right here, right now—whether it’s stocks or crypto, it’s just like it was back then.
1/ What exactly happened on May 19, 2021?
Let’s start with the background.
That bull run in 2021, at its core, was a leveraged bull market caused by central banks around the world massively flooding the system with liquidity after the COVID-19 pandemic. But at the same time, it was also the first real cycle in which DeFi became the main market narrative.
BTC and ETH charged forward with a bunch of major core DeFi coins.
Most exchanges basically listed whatever DeFi coin they could.
Storage mining coins—like CHIA and FIL—were all the rage.
ETH, BSC, and Tron almost flew in a three-line sprint.
From November 2020 to May 2021, the market barely went through any significant pullbacks.
But that week of 519 was the turning point for the entire bull market.
BTC crashed from $59,600 down to $31,300.
ETH was slashed in half, from $4,300 straight down to $2,200.
700,000 people were liquidated.
Network-wide contract OI fell by 60% overnight.
This was a truly violent deleveraging.
2/ What was the trigger for 519?
519 itself wasn’t caused by a single event—it was a forced liquidation triggered by a chain of events.
On the macro side, starting in May, more and more voices began questioning rising inflation and the idea that U.S. economic growth had topped out.
On 5/12, the strongest trade-signal king from the previous cycle, Elon Musk, announced that Tesla would pause accepting BTC payments.
On 5/13, Binance was reported by the media to be under DOJ / IRS investigation.
On 5/18, three major associations in China—the China Banking Association, the Payment and Clearing Association, and the Internet Finance Association—issued statements reiterating that financial institutions and payment institutions must not provide crypto-related services.
Note: this wasn’t the so-called “joint statement by seven ministries.” It was an industry document from three associations. But at that time the market was already fragile enough that such a policy signal was enough to ignite everything.
On 5/21, the Financial Committee under China’s State Council further clarified the need to crack down on BTC mining and trading behavior.
At the same time, nothing stayed quiet on-chain.
Venus Protocol suffered massive liquidations and bad-debt events. If I remember correctly, this should have been one of the largest levels of protocol bad debt in DeFi history at the time.
This series of events precisely hit the main narrative of the market at that moment:
BTC, ETH, exchange leverage, DeFi, BSC farms, and all the high-beta offshoots they had expanded into.
The transmission path was extremely clear:
Underlying BTC / ETH drops
→ Collateral value falls
→ CEX contract liquidations
→ DeFi lending liquidations
→ Liquidity mining blows up
→ Offshoots lose their buyers
519 wasn’t “just a drop.”
519 was forced liquidations overnight, followed by a continuous crash.
I remember it especially vividly because that day I went out for a dinner get-together and got a stomachache; while in the bathroom, I watched the cascading liquidations unfold on my phone the whole time.
Almost every exchange went down.
Prices were basically smashed through by liquidations.
And the expectation of upstream liquidity instability was actually already very clear before it even happened.
3/ U.S. stocks, 623—right here, right now, just like it was back then.
Two weeks ago, everyone who was shouting that AI / semiconductors in the U.S. stock market were “betting on mankind’s civilization” went silent.
Just like in the crypto world five years ago.
That week, first, three things happened:
A supply-chain price dispute between MU and Apple came to the surface;
Meta announced it would rent out compute capacity;
SK Hynix announced large-scale capacity expansion.
The external variable was the ambiguity about rate hikes and policy uncertainty released after the new guy took office.
The outcome was also very familiar:
The leading AI / semiconductor names almost collectively dropped to near the lows of the monthly line for the first time in months.
At first glance, it seems like this has nothing to do with 519.
But the logic is completely the same.
Uncertainty in the macro direction started to propagate upstream on the split-position structures in AI / semiconductors, sending signals of upstream liquidity contraction.
When liquidity at the center of BTC / exchanges / DeFi was hit
vs
When expectations of CAPEX allocation of “scarcity commands a premium” were reversed
At its core, both are breaks in upstream liquidity expectations within a Ponzi-like structure.
In other words:
Bet on big players / fast expansion of DeFi infrastructure
vs
Bet on CAPEX being prioritized for “bottleneck” sectors
The theoretical foundations of both speculative expectations started to be broken.
Back then, big names in mining had to go overseas.
Now, HBM giants have to expand capacity.
On the surface, this looks like good news: more investment, more capacity, long-term growth.
But in terms of market structure, this is a classic signal that the scarcity narrative has entered the capital expenditure cycle.
Convert current overvaluation into new supply;
Use new supply commitments to support future growth;
Use future growth to justify today’s overvaluation.
That’s the typical logic of split-position structures.
When the upstream side feels “it’s expensive,” it means it no longer feels “urgent.”
The premium for bottlenecks disappears.
Because people can just route directly and install ECMO.
When “scarce supply” enters “supply response,” the narrative premium will start to revert to how the market values cycle commodities.
As people discovered back then: liquidity mining couldn’t be pushed any further.
APY proves that demand has collapsed.
CAPEX proves that demand is being challenged.
The only difference is:
519 was an immediate liquidation.
623 is a relatively slow repricing.
4/ More importantly, later what happened was...
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #blockchain
Received a keyboard from MAX teacher @Jiming2607
It’s currently teaching my little cat how to get online 🥰
I have to say, OKX @okx’s sense of aesthetics has always stayed ahead of the game.
There are many suggestions for project teams to learn from this.
Merchandise is the most effective showcase to experience a brand’s strength and level.
And good merchandise speaks for itself—it comes with built-in promotional power.
On the other hand, look-alike “cheap and shoddy” merch is actually a negative factor.
It’s purely a waste of money.
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
It’s currently teaching my little cat how to get online 🥰
I have to say, OKX @okx’s sense of aesthetics has always stayed ahead of the game.
There are many suggestions for project teams to learn from this.
Merchandise is the most effective showcase to experience a brand’s strength and level.
And good merchandise speaks for itself—it comes with built-in promotional power.
On the other hand, look-alike “cheap and shoddy” merch is actually a negative factor.
It’s purely a waste of money.
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
Two days ago, a brother who successfully escaped the top suddenly found that the coin price was back again. He hurriedly bought it back, only to find he’d been dealing with trading fees all over again, and the entry price for the order was even higher.
After they finally got the order filled, maybe they’d have to sell off again. They rushed to escape the top and sold once more. That’s how bull markets come—back and forth as people keep trying to escape the top and missing out, even to the point of losing money just to run alongside. https://x.com/eth527/status/2075163011430420582
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
After they finally got the order filled, maybe they’d have to sell off again. They rushed to escape the top and sold once more. That’s how bull markets come—back and forth as people keep trying to escape the top and missing out, even to the point of losing money just to run alongside. https://x.com/eth527/status/2075163011430420582
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
Received a keyboard that MAX teacher @Jiming2607 fed me
Teaching my cat at home how to use the internet 🥰
I have to say, OKX @okx’s aesthetics have always stayed ahead of the curve
Lots of projects should take notes
Merchandise is the most direct showcase to experience a brand’s strength and level
And good merch is basically speaking for itself
It comes with a promotional function
On the contrary, merch that looks cheap and shoddy
ends up being a downside
Purely a waste of money
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
Teaching my cat at home how to use the internet 🥰
I have to say, OKX @okx’s aesthetics have always stayed ahead of the curve
Lots of projects should take notes
Merchandise is the most direct showcase to experience a brand’s strength and level
And good merch is basically speaking for itself
It comes with a promotional function
On the contrary, merch that looks cheap and shoddy
ends up being a downside
Purely a waste of money
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
Brothers who successfully escaped the top the other day suddenly found that the coin price was back again. Buy back quickly, only to discover that you’ve gone through all that hassle again with the fees. And the entry price for the order is even higher.
After they get their positions opened, maybe they’ll have to dump again. Escape the top fast, sell again. That’s how a bull market keeps going back and forth—escape the top, miss the move—sometimes even with the main aim of losing money to tag along. https://x.com/eth527/status/2075163011430420582
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
After they get their positions opened, maybe they’ll have to dump again. Escape the top fast, sell again. That’s how a bull market keeps going back and forth—escape the top, miss the move—sometimes even with the main aim of losing money to tag along. https://x.com/eth527/status/2075163011430420582
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
Many people try to tell me to justify being bearish with technical analysis
Then let me say something everyone likes: use magic to defeat magic
ETH’s 3-day MACD has formed a golden cross. The bullish volume columns have continued rising, and a triple-bottom divergence pattern has formed https://x.com/eth527/status/2072996792766173491
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #blockchain
Then let me say something everyone likes: use magic to defeat magic
ETH’s 3-day MACD has formed a golden cross. The bullish volume columns have continued rising, and a triple-bottom divergence pattern has formed https://x.com/eth527/status/2072996792766173491
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #blockchain
Many people try to tell me what kind of technical analysis arguments there are to go bearish.
So let’s say something everyone likes: use magic to defeat magic.
The MACD on ETH’s 3-day chart has formed a bullish golden cross. The long-position volume bars have been steadily rising, and a triple-bottom divergence pattern has formed. https://x.com/eth527/status/2072996792766173491
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
So let’s say something everyone likes: use magic to defeat magic.
The MACD on ETH’s 3-day chart has formed a bullish golden cross. The long-position volume bars have been steadily rising, and a triple-bottom divergence pattern has formed. https://x.com/eth527/status/2072996792766173491
Source: @Eth527 on X
Publish by using 6551 twitter mirror tool
#Crypto #Web3 #区块链
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