交易老鬼
43 Following
15 Followers
11 Liked
0 Shared
See original
$SOL
The last chance to escape! ! !
Cryptocurrency market liquidity dilemma and cycle turning point analysis
The current crypto market is facing a structural liquidity crisis. The leading trading platforms and public chain ecosystem show a significant Matthew effect. Traditional capital is more inclined to chase celebrity IP-type Meme assets such as Trump concept coins, causing the altcoin market to fall into a liquidity depletion dilemma. Historical cycle laws show that when the market falls into a negative-sum game stage (such as the bursting of the ICO bubble in 2018), public chain tokens often encounter systemic selling pressure.
Taking SOL as an example, its ecological prosperity is highly dependent on the false liquidity formed by the speculation craze of Meme tokens such as Pump.fun. The $2 billion token reserve that will be unlocked on March 1 is in sharp contrast to the gradually weakening market demand, and there is a risk exposure similar to the value recovery after Ethereum ICO. When speculative funds stop injecting blood into the Meme sector, public chain tokens may face a downward spiral in liquidity.
The current market is at a critical stage of risk clearing, and the real bottom signal needs to wait for: 1) The Meme token speculation craze completely subsides; 2) The on-chain gas fee drops to a cyclical low; 3) The trading volume of altcoins on mainstream exchanges continues to shrink. By then, protocol tokens with the ability to capture actual cash flow will show anti-fall properties, while assets lacking fundamental support may face the risk of a second halving. It is recommended that everyone maintain a reserve of liquid assets and wait for the market to complete the generational switch.
The last chance to escape! ! !
Cryptocurrency market liquidity dilemma and cycle turning point analysis
The current crypto market is facing a structural liquidity crisis. The leading trading platforms and public chain ecosystem show a significant Matthew effect. Traditional capital is more inclined to chase celebrity IP-type Meme assets such as Trump concept coins, causing the altcoin market to fall into a liquidity depletion dilemma. Historical cycle laws show that when the market falls into a negative-sum game stage (such as the bursting of the ICO bubble in 2018), public chain tokens often encounter systemic selling pressure.
Taking SOL as an example, its ecological prosperity is highly dependent on the false liquidity formed by the speculation craze of Meme tokens such as Pump.fun. The $2 billion token reserve that will be unlocked on March 1 is in sharp contrast to the gradually weakening market demand, and there is a risk exposure similar to the value recovery after Ethereum ICO. When speculative funds stop injecting blood into the Meme sector, public chain tokens may face a downward spiral in liquidity.
The current market is at a critical stage of risk clearing, and the real bottom signal needs to wait for: 1) The Meme token speculation craze completely subsides; 2) The on-chain gas fee drops to a cyclical low; 3) The trading volume of altcoins on mainstream exchanges continues to shrink. By then, protocol tokens with the ability to capture actual cash flow will show anti-fall properties, while assets lacking fundamental support may face the risk of a second halving. It is recommended that everyone maintain a reserve of liquid assets and wait for the market to complete the generational switch.
See original
I’m not going to pretend anymore. I’m going to reveal my cards. I bought at almost the lowest point. I’m a trading genius!
See original
Post it again, you must do it, you must do it, do it as you go
You must get an airdrop, there is a high probability of an airdrop in June
ALIENX must-get project
AlienSwap launches a public chain for earning income by staking
Obtained financing led by OKX in two rounds of 17 million US dollars
The cycle is very fast and there will be an airdrop in June
Link: https://alienxchain.io/airdrop?invite_code=RzJzKc
The tutorial is as follows
1. Link the wallet + enter the invitation code: RzJzKc = receive the box
Then open the box (there is a mint button on the right, provided that the arb chain of your address has eth)
Every 300 addresses that successfully cast a box may open 0.01E
Open the box = get more $vAIX
2. After opening the box, you will get different $vAIX (opening the box requires 0.0001 ETH on ARB, which is basically equal to 0)
3. Do small tasks = get more boxes
The tasks are very simple, there is a question, the answer to the question: D, ABCD, B
I can't spend all the 50u I got even after the airdrop, because I started to spend 10u on tasks, and then I just signed in every day, and it cost 0.0001eth to open the box
#大盘走势 #Meme #WIF #二百撸空投 #SHIB $BTC $BNB $TNSR
You must get an airdrop, there is a high probability of an airdrop in June
ALIENX must-get project
AlienSwap launches a public chain for earning income by staking
Obtained financing led by OKX in two rounds of 17 million US dollars
The cycle is very fast and there will be an airdrop in June
Link: https://alienxchain.io/airdrop?invite_code=RzJzKc
The tutorial is as follows
1. Link the wallet + enter the invitation code: RzJzKc = receive the box
Then open the box (there is a mint button on the right, provided that the arb chain of your address has eth)
Every 300 addresses that successfully cast a box may open 0.01E
Open the box = get more $vAIX
2. After opening the box, you will get different $vAIX (opening the box requires 0.0001 ETH on ARB, which is basically equal to 0)
3. Do small tasks = get more boxes
The tasks are very simple, there is a question, the answer to the question: D, ABCD, B
I can't spend all the 50u I got even after the airdrop, because I started to spend 10u on tasks, and then I just signed in every day, and it cost 0.0001eth to open the box
#大盘走势 #Meme #WIF #二百撸空投 #SHIB $BTC $BNB $TNSR
See original
Post it again, you must do it, you must do it, do it as you go
You must get an airdrop, there is a high probability of an airdrop in June
ALIENX must-get project
AlienSwap launches a public chain for earning income by staking
Obtained financing led by OKX in two rounds of 17 million US dollars
The cycle is very fast and there will be an airdrop in June
Link: https://alienxchain.io/airdrop?invite_code=RzJzKc
The tutorial is as follows
1. Link the wallet + enter the invitation code: RzJzKc = receive the box
Then open the box (there is a mint button on the right, provided that the arb chain of your address has eth)
Every 300 addresses that successfully cast a box may open 0.01E
Open the box = get more $vAIX
2. After opening the box, you will get different $vAIX (opening the box requires 0.0001 ETH on ARB, which is basically equal to 0)
3. Do small tasks = get more boxes
The tasks are very simple, there is a question, the answer to the question: D, ABCD, B
I can't spend all the 50u I got even after the airdrop, because I started to spend 10u on tasks, and then I just signed in every day, and it cost 0.0001eth to open the box
#大盘走势 #Meme #WIF #二百撸空投 #SHIB $BTC $BNB $TNSR
You must get an airdrop, there is a high probability of an airdrop in June
ALIENX must-get project
AlienSwap launches a public chain for earning income by staking
Obtained financing led by OKX in two rounds of 17 million US dollars
The cycle is very fast and there will be an airdrop in June
Link: https://alienxchain.io/airdrop?invite_code=RzJzKc
The tutorial is as follows
1. Link the wallet + enter the invitation code: RzJzKc = receive the box
Then open the box (there is a mint button on the right, provided that the arb chain of your address has eth)
Every 300 addresses that successfully cast a box may open 0.01E
Open the box = get more $vAIX
2. After opening the box, you will get different $vAIX (opening the box requires 0.0001 ETH on ARB, which is basically equal to 0)
3. Do small tasks = get more boxes
The tasks are very simple, there is a question, the answer to the question: D, ABCD, B
I can't spend all the 50u I got even after the airdrop, because I started to spend 10u on tasks, and then I just signed in every day, and it cost 0.0001eth to open the box
#大盘走势 #Meme #WIF #二百撸空投 #SHIB $BTC $BNB $TNSR
See original
Damn, this is a bit awesome
Detailed reveal: How the master used uni to harvest 660,000 US dollars of wool last night! (via CoinsRadar.net):
Last night (2024.2.23)
#uni In an instant, the price rose from 7 US dollars to 11 US dollars.
Compound is a lending agreement that allows users to mortgage other currencies (such as usdc) to borrow uni. For a short period of time after the instant pull of uni, compound did not update the price of uni in a timely manner, resulting in the agreement being able to use mortgages with low uni values. Go and borrow uni. This was discovered by a very few people, who borrowed a large amount of uni by mortgaging usdc, and then sold the uni into usdc. Then you will find that the amount of usdc they obtained is actually more than the amount of compound they mortgaged. Let me carefully analyze this attack on the lending protocol. The data source is https://bad-debt.riskdao.org/. The addresses that are profitable for the attack are the following four: 0x6980a47bee930a4584b09ee79ebe46484fbdbdd0
0x5968ada261a84e19a6c85830e655647752585ed4
0x49bc3cec1fb7978746f742a4e485d0d601831cea
0x2f99fb66ea797e7fa2d07262402ab38bd5e53b12
Now check the balances of these four addresses on debank. You will find that in the compound protocol, these four addresses have a debt, but the collateral is almost zero, as follows:
This screenshot shows that the address 0x2f99fb66ea797e7fa2d07262402ab38bd5e53b12 mortgaged 1.1503Dai and 0.051715usdc in compound, but borrowed 28702.7973uni. The collateral is almost 0, but the value of the borrowed uni is as high as 330,000 U. In this case, this address will definitely not repay the uni debt. The other three addresses are the same, using almost zero collateral and borrowing hundreds of thousands of U uni coins. These four addresses have borrowed a total of 55,565.9001uni. Currently calculated as 12U each, the total value is 55565.9*12=666790.8 usdt, resulting in a loss of 660,000 U.
Why is it possible to borrow and sell hundreds of thousands of uni coins while using almost zero collateral? The entire attack logic is as follows: 1. Assume that it is time point T0, the price of uni in the market is 7U/uni, and the price feed of compound to uni is normal, which is also 7U/uni2. Then at time point T1, uni is in the market The price on the website suddenly skyrocketed, reaching 11U/uni in an instant. However, there is an error in the price feed of uni in compound, and it still stays at 7U/uni.3. Then someone discovered that Compound’s price feed for Uni was wrong, and immediately mortgaged 200,000 USDC into Compound as collateral, and borrowed Uni coins at the top of the price, according to Compound’s feed price (7u/uni, and a loan rate of 85% ), you can borrow 20*0.85=170,000 U of uni, 170000/7=24285.7143 uni, that is, you can borrow 24,000 uni. 4. Then sell the 24,000 uni in the market (such as uniswap v3) and exchange it for usdc. Because the market price is 11U/uni, you can sell it for 2.4*11=26.4 wUsdc, which is 64,000 more than the collateral. Usdc, this is profit. The following transaction https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaee0f8d1235584a3212f233b655f87b89f22f1d4890782447c4ef742b37af58d can clearly see the above logic.
It mortgaged 193020usdc, lent 19748uni, sold uni to ETH and then ETH to usdc, and finally received 195461usdc, which was 195461-193020=2441 usdc more than the collateral. 5. After Compound feeds the correct Uni currency price into the agreement, these debts will definitely be liquidated, and the liquidation will not be clean. Even if the liquidator takes away all the collateral, a large amount of Uni debt will still be left. This is bad debt.
Why does compound have a uni price feed error? Compound has currently launched a vote to fix this bug. Because compound uses double insurance to set the price of uni currency, one is to use chainlink’s oracle price feed, and it also uses Uniswap TWAP (time weighted average price). But I didn’t check the specific choice between the two price feeds. But judging from the current results, both of them must be normal at the same time for compound to feed prices normally. When the price of uni suddenly skyrocketed, chainlink's price feed was normal, but there was a problem with the price of UniswapTWAP, and the compound protocol gave the wrong price.
😍Follow me! Get news faster!
Last night (2024.2.23)
#uni In an instant, the price rose from 7 US dollars to 11 US dollars.
Compound is a lending agreement that allows users to mortgage other currencies (such as usdc) to borrow uni. For a short period of time after the instant pull of uni, compound did not update the price of uni in a timely manner, resulting in the agreement being able to use mortgages with low uni values. Go and borrow uni. This was discovered by a very few people, who borrowed a large amount of uni by mortgaging usdc, and then sold the uni into usdc. Then you will find that the amount of usdc they obtained is actually more than the amount of compound they mortgaged. Let me carefully analyze this attack on the lending protocol. The data source is https://bad-debt.riskdao.org/. The addresses that are profitable for the attack are the following four: 0x6980a47bee930a4584b09ee79ebe46484fbdbdd0
0x5968ada261a84e19a6c85830e655647752585ed4
0x49bc3cec1fb7978746f742a4e485d0d601831cea
0x2f99fb66ea797e7fa2d07262402ab38bd5e53b12
Now check the balances of these four addresses on debank. You will find that in the compound protocol, these four addresses have a debt, but the collateral is almost zero, as follows:
This screenshot shows that the address 0x2f99fb66ea797e7fa2d07262402ab38bd5e53b12 mortgaged 1.1503Dai and 0.051715usdc in compound, but borrowed 28702.7973uni. The collateral is almost 0, but the value of the borrowed uni is as high as 330,000 U. In this case, this address will definitely not repay the uni debt. The other three addresses are the same, using almost zero collateral and borrowing hundreds of thousands of U uni coins. These four addresses have borrowed a total of 55,565.9001uni. Currently calculated as 12U each, the total value is 55565.9*12=666790.8 usdt, resulting in a loss of 660,000 U.
Why is it possible to borrow and sell hundreds of thousands of uni coins while using almost zero collateral? The entire attack logic is as follows: 1. Assume that it is time point T0, the price of uni in the market is 7U/uni, and the price feed of compound to uni is normal, which is also 7U/uni2. Then at time point T1, uni is in the market The price on the website suddenly skyrocketed, reaching 11U/uni in an instant. However, there is an error in the price feed of uni in compound, and it still stays at 7U/uni.3. Then someone discovered that Compound’s price feed for Uni was wrong, and immediately mortgaged 200,000 USDC into Compound as collateral, and borrowed Uni coins at the top of the price, according to Compound’s feed price (7u/uni, and a loan rate of 85% ), you can borrow 20*0.85=170,000 U of uni, 170000/7=24285.7143 uni, that is, you can borrow 24,000 uni. 4. Then sell the 24,000 uni in the market (such as uniswap v3) and exchange it for usdc. Because the market price is 11U/uni, you can sell it for 2.4*11=26.4 wUsdc, which is 64,000 more than the collateral. Usdc, this is profit. The following transaction https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaee0f8d1235584a3212f233b655f87b89f22f1d4890782447c4ef742b37af58d can clearly see the above logic.
It mortgaged 193020usdc, lent 19748uni, sold uni to ETH and then ETH to usdc, and finally received 195461usdc, which was 195461-193020=2441 usdc more than the collateral. 5. After Compound feeds the correct Uni currency price into the agreement, these debts will definitely be liquidated, and the liquidation will not be clean. Even if the liquidator takes away all the collateral, a large amount of Uni debt will still be left. This is bad debt.
Why does compound have a uni price feed error? Compound has currently launched a vote to fix this bug. Because compound uses double insurance to set the price of uni currency, one is to use chainlink’s oracle price feed, and it also uses Uniswap TWAP (time weighted average price). But I didn’t check the specific choice between the two price feeds. But judging from the current results, both of them must be normal at the same time for compound to feed prices normally. When the price of uni suddenly skyrocketed, chainlink's price feed was normal, but there was a problem with the price of UniswapTWAP, and the compound protocol gave the wrong price.
😍Follow me! Get news faster!
Login to explore more contents