The Cetus hacker originates from the Aptos ecosystem?
#SUI🔥 #Aptos #Cetus The recent security incident involving the Cetus protocol exhibits significant deviations from the typical operational patterns of the Lazarus Group, essentially ruling out involvement by this North Korean hacking collective. Notably, the attacker demonstrated advanced technical proficiency in exploiting vulnerabilities in the Move language, yet displayed relative inexperience in subsequent fund transfer and obfuscation procedures. Cetus initially participated deeply within the Aptos ecosystem but failed to secure substantial market share. It subsequently migrated to the Sui ecosystem where it achieved significant growth, establishing itself as a key participant within Sui. This trajectory of transitioning from one competing ecosystem to another and achieving success may objectively intensify the competitive dynamics between Aptos and Sui. Speculation exists that Aptos may harbor negative views regarding Cetus's successful transition and its contributions to the Sui ecosystem, potentially even possessing an underlying motivation to undermine Sui's development by targeting Cetus. It is noteworthy that Mo Shaikh, Co-Founder and former CEO of Aptos, recently publicly expressed a favorable stance towards Sui over Aptos. This statement, made post-departure, potentially reflects internal divisions within the Aptos team or, at minimum, reveals complex sentiments among some members regarding Sui's developmental momentum, potentially including negative emotions arising from competitive pressures. From a technical perspective, compared to widely adopted languages like Ethereum's Solidity and Solana's Rust, the Move language ecosystem employed by Sui remains relatively niche. Furthermore, the Total Value Locked (TVL) within the Sui ecosystem is currently significantly lower than Ethereum's. For external professional hackers focused on maximizing economic gain, the return on investment for dedicating resources to researching Move contract vulnerabilities may appear suboptimal. However, the perpetrator in this incident demonstrated a profound mastery of Move, with technical sophistication far exceeding that of typical hackers. This strongly suggests the attacker possesses deep-rooted, specialized knowledge likely cultivated through long-term immersion within the Move ecosystem. Given that Aptos and Sui share the Move language foundation, and considering Aptos's ecosystem and core development team house numerous top-tier Move experts, Aptos or its affiliates emerge as significant potential suspects from the standpoint of both technical capability and plausible competitive motivation. Historically, Aptos and Sui engaged in intense rivalry during their early development stages, with public reports even suggesting Aptos attempted inappropriate competitive tactics to constrain Sui's growth. Currently, Sui has gained industry recognition for its progress in technological iteration and ecosystem development, while Aptos's developmental pace has comparatively slowed, resulting in a widening gap. Within this competitive landscape, the possibility cannot be discounted that Aptos or its affiliates might resort to unconventional measures, potentially including orchestrating attacks against key projects within the Sui ecosystem such as Cetus, to reverse competitive disadvantages or disrupt the opponent's progress. Should subsequent investigations conclusively link this Cetus security incident directly to the Aptos ecosystem, such actions would constitute a severe violation of the blockchain industry's established security principles and ethical standards. This conduct would not only significantly damage Aptos's own industry reputation and credibility but also provoke deep scrutiny from the broader Web3 community regarding its business ethics, potentially culminating in its isolation within the industry.