OldManHolder

Trap Behind “Free” Airdropped Tokens: A #Bob Token Case Study
Its just over a day, a token named $BOB on the Base network, with the contract address
basescan.org/address/0xedc0…, gained sudden popularity on platforms like Birdeye, showing over $140K market cap, 85%+ daily pump, and millions of BOB tokens distributed to wallets.
At first glance, it appeared to be a promising opportunity for early buyers or lucky recipients. But upon closer inspection, this token serves as a perfect example of how fake airdrop tactics and event spoofing can deceive the community.
⚠️ Faking Ownership: The Illusion of a Balance
On-chain explorers such as BaseScan display token transfers under the “ERC-20 Token Transfers” tab. If you search the address 0x1A9bdf022eaFAa88985a36c553259DEe1f418375, you'll see a transaction showing receipt of 4.7M BOB tokens from the BOB contract, using the execute() method. However, a balance check using balanceOf() directly on-chain returns zero — the wallet does not actually hold the BOB tokens.
Why the mismatch? Because the contract's execute() and claim() methods only emit a Transfer event without updating _balances. Here’s the code:

function execute(address [] calldata _addresses_, uint256 _out) external {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _addresses_.length; i++) {
emit Transfer(_p76234, _addresses_[i], _out);
}
}
No balanceOf modification, no mint, no transfer — just an event. Wallets and explorers that rely on logs instead of state will wrongly display this as a token holding.
🧪 How It Tricks Explorers and Wallets
Many Web3 wallets (@phantom, @Rabby_io , @MetaMask, @rainbowdotme ) parse ERC-20 logs to detect token balances. Because the fake Transfer logs look real, the wallet UI shows the tokens — fooling users into thinking they’ve received an actual airdrop. But DEXs and contracts that read balanceOf() will return zero, and hence disallow swaps or transfers.
Try swapping on any 1inch/Uniswap DEX: You’ll be told “Insufficient balance,” despite the visual indication in your wallet that you hold tokens. This is because the token contract has never assigned you real on-chain state ownership.
🧼 Why This Pattern Is Dangerous
The token has liquidity (~$36k) and real trades on Birdeye. The top wallets have valid balances — likely held by the dev or insiders — and they can sell. Meanwhile, you, the "airdropped" user, cannot. This creates the illusion of distribution and virality, while the token supply remains tightly controlled.
The token even defines a special transfer restriction:
if((from != _p76234 && to == ) || ...)
require(_X7W88 < _e242);
📉 Endgame: Dump on Retail, Then Rug
These schemes are typically short-lived. Once volume increases, insiders dump on hopeful buyers who think they’re catching a mooning #memecoin. The result? Retail investors get rugged, while the "airdropped" holders are left with a token they never truly held.
✅ TL;DR — Always Inspect the Contract
Check if balanceOf() increases after a transfer.
Avoid interacting with tokens received unsolicited.
Review if _balances is actually updated in the contract.
Events without state = illusion.