Trying to achieve "decentralization" through "centralization" seems a bit contradictory. This thought has been on my mind recently when reviewing the data of the current Decentralized Voices (DV) group. We have delegated voting rights of approximately 42 million DOTs and 180,000 KSM to different DAOs in the community to enable them to play an active role in OpenGov. The original intention is clear: we hope to give responsible and deep thinking people in the Polkadot ecosystem the opportunity to truly influence governance decisions.
After a year of operation, this plan has worked to some extent, although it is still imperfect. We can see that new voices, new groups, and a new culture of participation have emerged in the Polkadot governance space.
Now, as we evaluate the performance of the DV group and think about the future direction, we can't help but ask: Is DV a temporary measure taken to stimulate broader participation - that is, "using the concentration of a few to drive the participation of the majority", or has it simply spawned a new "voting elite class" who have become the "concentrators" in the ecosystem?
This forum post will dive into some of the past data and community perspectives, review the DV group’s successes and shortcomings, and explore how we can work together to advance its next phase.
DV Group Highlights: Engagement and Results
In the current group and its first month of delegation, the six DV representatives have been very active. They have discussed dozens of referendums in depth and voted hundreds of times. While their voting styles vary — some vote on nearly all proposals, others tend to abstain — it’s interesting to note that their voting results are generally consistent with the broader community.
Our recent internal analysis shows that if Decentralized Voice (DV) votes were not counted, about 18.9% of referendum results would be reversed. In other words, people often think that DV will affect the majority of votes, but this is not always the case. After all, if the "result change rate" is 0%, then setting DV is meaningless - and nearly 19% shows that DV does have an impact.
It is very rare that the voting results of DV representatives are inconsistent with the majority opinion: less than 1 in 30 referendums will have a DV majority vote different from the final vote result. In these rare cases, even if the majority of DVs oppose (or support) a proposal, the proposal may still pass (or be rejected). However, most of the time, the voting results of DV will strengthen the mainstream opinion. This balance - DV can amplify the voice of the community while DV cannot easily change the voting results - precisely reflects the best positioning of DV and its core influence.
In Polkadot's OpenGov governance, there is no so-called single correct answer for everyone's vote and choice. This is because different people may have different opinions and positions when facing proposals. And behind these different choices, there are often many differences between participants:
Not only region and background (e.g. from different countries, cultural backgrounds)
It also includes personality differences (e.g. some people are cautious, others are bold)
Risk tolerance (some people prefer to be safe, others are willing to take risks)
and their ideas about governance (e.g. some people value transparency and fairness, others value efficiency and results)
So, even in a relatively small group (for example, only a few DV representatives), they can reflect diversity, and this diversity is very important for the entire governance process and the quality of decision-making.
Of course, there are positives: the advent of DV has undoubtedly sparked some positive changes in the governance space. Since its launch, we have seen treasury proposals come under greater scrutiny and spending has become more prudent. Proposals are more likely to be pushed toward structured bounties rather than ad hoc approvals, which is a good trend. Some delegates are particularly known for being strict and asking tough questions: “Is this worth funding?” “Why is it so urgent?” “Where are the deliverables?” “What are the metrics?” This pressure is important, brings discipline, and is contagious. It’s a structural win, albeit one that’s hard to measure with quantitative metrics.
More importantly, DV seems to have inspired others to get involved. A number of new DAOs have been formed around governance, including local organizations in Eastern Europe, China, and Latin America. People who never thought of themselves as "governance people" are now participating. And I think this is partly due to the halo effect of DV. People see that if you stand up, organize, and show your thinking ability, you can be taken seriously and earn a seat at the table.
Perhaps DV’s greatest success is its cultural impact. It redistributes possibilities. As Vikk of Hungarian DAO once observed: “Many new DAOs have emerged in the past few months, and they actively participate in the decision-making process… I guess it’s because they want to be part of the decentralized voice in the future.”
Problems are emerging
Of course, no experiment is perfect, and some issues have already surfaced. Some community members have discovered that they can amplify their influence by joining multiple delegated DAOs. In practice, this means that the same participants can vote multiple times in different groups. As one commenter pointed out, this "packaging" of influence runs counter to the original intention of DV. This is indeed a concern: if DV ends up just creating another elite class of "big players" in multiple DAOs, then we haven't actually solved the problem of centralization.
Another unresolved issue is accountability. DV delegates do not vote with their own DOTs, but rather with W3F (Web3 Foundation) DOTs. On the one hand, this demonstrates trust; but on the other hand, there is no automatic penalty mechanism if someone votes irresponsibly (although all votes can be manually reviewed). The project's rules require delegates to explain their votes and abstain from voting on proposals where there is a conflict of interest.
If there are no clear consequences for voting (for example, representatives will not be punished for voting irresponsibly), how can we ensure that they will fulfill their responsibilities? The current practice is to advise representatives to abstain from voting when they encounter a proposal with a conflict of interest; some people call for representatives to publicly disclose their possible conflicts of interest in such cases. However, these practices are not formally stipulated, and perhaps the community should establish a set of clear rules. For example, some people suggest that it can be stipulated that each representative is only allowed to participate in one DAO, must be forced to disclose their relationship with other organizations, and even establish a formal punishment mechanism (such as penalties for improper voting). This raises a question: in a governance system that is supposed to be completely transparent and trustless, we actually rely on a lot of "default rules" or potential moral self-discipline, but lack formal and systematic constraints.
In theory, self-policing and public oversight should keep delegates honest. But some question who bears the consequences if a delegate votes wrong? They don’t lose money or reputation like ordinary voters do. This asymmetry makes people uneasy, so it’s worth exploring whether additional safeguards are needed.
This also leads to philosophical questions. DV (Decentralized Voices) attempts to find a balance between direct democracy and trust delegation. Direct democracy means that every token holder can personally participate in voting and express their opinions directly; while trust delegation is to give this voting power to some active people or organizations (such as DV) to exercise voting rights on their behalf. The original intention of doing so was to make up for the reality that most token holders are inactive and too lazy to participate. But this delegation means that "everyone participates by themselves" has changed to "represented by a few people", which in itself changes the nature of governance. This is not a bad thing, but different governance models have their own advantages and disadvantages. The design of DV attempts to "walk a tightrope" between the two. On the one hand, it amplifies the voice of the community and allows more thoughtful opinions to be heard, and on the other hand, it strives to avoid these representatives from evolving into a new "elite" or "ruling group" that controls governance. This balance is very delicate, with both risks and potential benefits.
But can this be done perfectly? Can it be done in a way that empowers people without creating hierarchy? I’m not sure.
The Web3 Foundation does not want to be the only voter on proposals. It wants to spread its influence across the community and empower responsible and thoughtful actors. In this sense, DV is not only a delegation experiment, it is more like a governance guide, a cultural investment, or a "parachute" to help a governance system that is still learning how to land smoothly.
The question now is: do we keep using this parachute, cut the cord and hope for a smooth glide, or completely redesign it?
What lies ahead?
So here we are. The program is well advanced, the results are mixed but significant, and now it’s time to decide what to do next.
I’ve been thinking about the tension I’ve felt in the meeting and in previous discussions about the future of DV. There’s no clear consensus, really. There are just underlying forces pulling opinions in different directions. On the one hand, there’s excitement that DV is attracting new talent into governance, facilitating discussion, and even helping to curb some irresponsible treasury spending. On the other hand, there’s also a growing sense of unease: questions about overlapping membership, questions about accountability, and concerns that we’ve just created a new form of “soft centralization.”
Perhaps this is the clearest sign that this experiment is real: it stirs the waters and forces us to ask questions we are not yet ready to answer.
Here are three broad scenarios we outline for the next phase of DV. These are just starting points for brainstorming, not final solutions. We welcome all creative and constructive suggestions. Think of these as starting points for conversation: mix and match, imagine fusion solutions, or come up with completely new ideas. If you have a bold new governance model that can replace DV, we would love to hear it!
Option A: Terminate the program
Core idea: After the current batch of DV ends, the DV plan will be officially terminated. Acknowledge that although DV has produced positive effects, its structural defects have outweighed the benefits. Return to a pure token holder voting system.
Key Features:
Officially ending Decentralized Voice (DV) as a program.
The Foundation can continue to participate in governance, but there will no longer be dedicated community representatives.
Option B: Scale and Decentralize
Core idea: Push DV further, but disperse power more widely. Add more representatives, each holding less DOT quota, to reduce the influence of a single representative and further expand representation.
Key Features:
Increase the number of DV representatives (e.g. from 6 to 10 or more).
Each representative holds less voting power (e.g. 1–2 million DOTs each instead of 7 million).
Prioritize diverse representation (covering more regions, different focus areas, or communities).
There are more voices and power is more dispersed, making the overall impact wider.
Option C: Reform and co-creation of DV 2.0
Core idea: Design a new version of DV with the community. While retaining the catalytic effect of DV, solve existing problems. You can think of it as DV 2.0 co-created with everyone.
Key Features:
Introducing community nominated or elected representatives, alongside appointed representatives.
Set term limits or rotate representatives regularly to prevent a small group from monopolizing power.
Formalize conflict of interest rules (e.g., mandatory public disclosure statements, clear waiver requirements).
Representatives are required to stake a certain amount of DOT as a “interest bundle” so that their voting behavior is consistent with their interests.
Create a mentor system: Pair experienced governance groups with emerging forces to train the next generation of DVs.
Again: these are not exhaustive, but meant to stimulate discussion. Feel free to imagine hybrids (e.g. combining extensions with some reforms), or come up with new ideas entirely. Perhaps DV could evolve into something new that we haven't thought of yet. The point is to brainstorm. All suggestions are welcome - even the most out-of-this-world ones!
Why this post? What to do next?
This post is not a conclusion, but a question. We will collect community feedback and propose several non-binding "WFC" referendums in OpenGov. These votes will not change the rules immediately, but will be used to gauge the community's attitude towards the future direction. Your opinions will directly influence the design of these questions.
So please look at these ideas critically, suggest improvements, or even suggest a completely different path. If you see blind spots in our thinking, please point them out. Together, let’s leverage the diversity of our community — both veteran governance and new voices — to create the next chapter of decentralized voice.
What do you think? Feel free to leave a comment in the comments section or go to the forum to join the discussion!
Post link: https://forum.polkadot.network/t/reflections-on-the-dv-program-so-far-whats-next/13046
