This article is only a personal market view and does not constitute investment advice. If you act on it, you are responsible for your own profits and losses.
Beijing-based traders: on-chain data users, trend traders.
People who are new to martial arts always want to learn an invincible move, to kill the enemy with one move, and win every battle. However, as they practice, they realize that without strong internal force, there is no way to talk about invincible moves, and internal force comes from internal skills. Therefore, in martial arts novels, there is never a specific move that is the best in the world, only the best skills in the world.
"Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" is one of the classic books for traders. The book does not contain any specific moves, but only the concepts of trading, that is, the inner skills of trading. The same is true for the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" that I have been reading recently. One of the articles is "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", which I was very touched after reading. Trading is a war in itself. Therefore, some of the concepts about war in Mao's Selected Works are undoubtedly applicable to trading, and are inner skills that are worth reading repeatedly. The following are some of the excerpts. I originally planned to attach some of my own opinions, but later I thought that it might have a negative effect, so this article is just an excerpt to share:
We should respect the experience of past bloodshed, but we should also respect our own experience of bloodshed.
Different war situations determine different laws governing wars, which vary in time, region and nature. When we study the laws governing wars at different historical stages, of different natures, in different regions and among different nations, we should focus on their characteristics and their development, and oppose the mechanical view on the question of war.
All laws governing war develop in accordance with the development of history and the development of war; nothing is immutable.
If you understand global things, you will be better at using local things, because local things are subordinate to global things.
The saying "one careless move can lead to the loss of the whole game" refers to a move that has a global impact, that is, a move that has a decisive impact on the overall situation, rather than a move that has a local impact, that is, a move that has no decisive impact on the overall situation. This is true in chess and in war.
In the history of war, there are cases where a defeat after a series of victories led to a complete loss of all the war efforts, and there are cases where a victory after many defeats led to a new situation. The "consecutive victories" and "many defeats" mentioned here are local and do not play a decisive role in the overall situation. The "one defeat" and "one victory" mentioned here are both decisive. All of these illustrate the importance of taking care of the overall situation. The most important thing for the person in charge of the overall situation is to focus on taking care of the overall situation of the war.
It is extremely rare for everything to be consistent in war and battle, because the two sides of a war or battle are groups of armed living people, and they keep secrets from each other, which is very different from dealing with static objects or daily events. However, as long as the command is generally suitable for the situation, that is, suitable for the situation in the decisive part, it is the basis for victory.
The commander's correct deployment comes from the correct decision, the correct decision comes from the correct judgment, the correct judgment comes from the careful and necessary reconnaissance, and the coherent thinking of various reconnaissance materials.
Careless military strategists do not do this, and base their military plans on wishful thinking, which is utopian and unrealistic. Reckless military strategists who rely solely on enthusiasm are inevitably deceived by the enemy, seduced by the enemy's superficial or one-sided situation, and instigated by the irresponsible and unsightly suggestions of their subordinates, and thus inevitably run into obstacles, because they do not know or are unwilling to know that any military plan should be based on necessary reconnaissance and careful thinking about the enemy's and our own situations and their mutual relations.
The process of understanding the situation exists not only before the establishment of a military plan, but also after the establishment of a military plan. When a certain plan is implemented, from the beginning of implementation to the end of the war, this is another process of understanding the situation, that is, the process of implementation. At this time, it is necessary to re-examine whether the things in the first process are in line with the actual situation. If the plan and the situation do not match, or do not completely match, it is necessary to form a new judgment and make a new determination based on the new understanding, and change the existing plan to make it suitable for the new situation. Partial changes occur in almost every battle, and complete changes also occur occasionally. The reckless do not know how to change, or are unwilling to change, but just blindly do things, and the result is bound to hit a wall.
All military laws or military theories with principles are summaries of past war experiences made by our predecessors or contemporaries. We should focus on learning the bloody lessons left to us by these past wars. This is one thing. However, there is another thing, which is to verify these conclusions from our own experience, absorb those that are useful, and add those that are unique to us. This latter thing is very important. If we do not do this, we will not be able to guide the war.
It is absolutely correct to say that revolution and revolutionary war are offensive, but also defensive and retreating.
When should we end our offensive and enter the preparatory stage for counter-encirclement and suppression? When we are in the midst of a victorious offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, the enemy's preparations for encirclement and suppression are carried out in secret, and it is difficult for us to know when they will start their offensive. If we start our preparations for counter-encirclement and suppression too early, it will inevitably reduce the gains of the offensive and sometimes have a certain adverse effect on the Red Army and the people. This is because the main steps in the preparatory stage are military preparations for retreat and political mobilization for the preparation of retreat. Sometimes, if we prepare too early, we will end up waiting for the enemy; after waiting for a long time and the enemy does not come, we have to launch our offensive again. Sometimes, just when we have just started our renewed offensive, we happen to encounter the beginning of the enemy's offensive, putting ourselves in a difficult position. Therefore, the choice of the right time to start preparations becomes an important issue. To determine this time, we must look at the situation of both sides and the relationship between the two. In order to understand the enemy's situation, we must collect materials from the enemy's political, military, financial and social opinion aspects. When analyzing these materials, we must fully estimate the enemy's overall strength and not exaggerate the extent of the enemy's past failures, but we must also never fail to estimate the enemy's internal contradictions, financial difficulties, the impact of past failures, etc. We should not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but we should also not underestimate the impact of our past victories.
Generally speaking, it is better to start preparing too early than too late. The loss of the latter is smaller than the former, and the benefit is that you are prepared for any eventuality and are basically invincible.
Political mobilization is the first important issue in the struggle against encirclement and suppression. This means clearly, resolutely and fully telling the Red Army personnel and the people in the base areas about the inevitability and urgency of the enemy's attack and the seriousness of the harm it will cause to the people.
The relaxation of preparation caused by underestimating the enemy and the panic caused by being frightened by the enemy's attack are both bad tendencies that should be resolutely opposed. What we need is a warm but calm mood and intense but orderly work.
The purpose of strategic retreat is to preserve military strength and prepare for counterattack. Retreat is necessary because if you do not give in to the attack of a powerful enemy, the preservation of military strength will be endangered.
To prepare for a counterattack, we must select and create a number of conditions that are favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy, so that the balance of power between the enemy and us changes, and then we can enter the counterattack stage.
Another necessary condition for a weak army to fight against a strong army is to attack the weak. However, when the enemy begins to attack, we often do not know which part of the enemy's army is the weakest, which part is the second strongest, and which part is the second weakest. We need a reconnaissance process. It often takes a lot of time to achieve this goal. The reason why strategic retreat is necessary is also a reason.
If the attacking enemy far exceeds our army in both numbers and strength, we will want the balance of power to change. We can only wait until the enemy penetrates deep into our base area and suffer the most there, just as the chief of staff of a brigade of Chiang Kai-shek said during the third encirclement and suppression campaign: "The fat ones will become thin, and the thin ones will be dragged to death."
To decide where the end point of retreat is, we must take the overall situation as a starting point. If the local situation seems favorable for us to switch to counterattack, but it is not also favorable for us in the overall situation, then it is incorrect to decide the end point of retreat based on this. This is because the beginning of the counterattack must take into account the changes that will occur later, and our counterattack always starts from the local situation.
Regarding the issue of losing land, it is often the case that only by losing it can we avoid losing it. This is the principle of "if you want to take it, you must first give it."
This is exactly why we suffered losses during the enemy's fifth campaign of encirclement and suppression. We were unwilling to lose part of our territory, but ended up losing all of it.
They only look at problems from a partial perspective, are unable to see the overall situation, are unwilling to connect today's interests with tomorrow's interests, or connect partial interests with overall interests, and will not let go of partial or temporary things.
The first battle of the counterattack is of great importance. The victory or defeat of the first battle has a great impact on the overall situation, and even affects the last battle. Therefore, the following conclusions are drawn:
1) First, we must win. The enemy situation, terrain, people and other conditions must be favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Only when we are sure of victory can we take action. Otherwise, we should retreat and wait for the right opportunity. There are always opportunities, so we should not rush into battle. Reject all suggestions for hasty action.
2) Secondly, the plan for the first battle must be an organic prelude to the plan for the entire campaign. Without a good plan for the entire campaign, there can be no truly good first battle. That is to say, even if you win the first battle, if this battle is not only not beneficial to the entire campaign, but is harmful, then this battle is only a defeat even if you win. Therefore, before fighting the first battle, you must think about how to fight the second, third, fourth and even the last battle in general, how the overall situation of the enemy will change if you win the battles one by one, and how it will change if you lose. Without the overall situation in mind, you will not be able to make a good move.
3) Third, we must also think about the articles for the next strategic stage. If we only focus on counterattacks and ignore what to do next after the victory of the counterattack or in case of failure, we still have not fulfilled the responsibility of a strategic leader. When a strategic leader is in a strategic stage, he should calculate most of the subsequent stages, at least the next stage. Although future changes are unpredictable and the farther we look, the more uncertain they are, it is still possible to make general calculations and it is necessary to estimate the future prospects. The kind of guidance method of taking one step at a time is not good for politics and for war. When taking a step, we should look at the specific changes in that step and modify or develop our own strategic and campaign plans accordingly. If we do not do this, we will make the mistake of risky direct rush. However, a long-term policy that runs through the entire strategic stage or even several strategic stages and is generally thought through is absolutely indispensable.
4) The battle must be won; the entire campaign plan must be taken into consideration; the next strategic phase must be taken into consideration; these are the three principles that must not be forgotten when the counterattack begins, that is, when fighting the first battle.
All wars cannot have absolutely fixed battle lines; the changes in victory and defeat, advance and retreat, cannot be allowed to be so.
Finally, you are welcome to send private messages to share your personal understanding.
Follow me and earn maximum trend profits with minimal operations.
