#dusk $DUSK @Dusk I’ve been getting stuck on one question with DUSK is one million tiny confidential transfers actually harder than 1,000 institutional ones moving serious financial value?
At first I assumed yes, because more transactions should mean more work. But that starts looking too simple once private computation enters the picture.
A €20 transfer and a €20 million hedging action may both become “one transaction” on a dashboard, yet the second could involve far more encrypted state, proof generation and financial dependency. So TPS alone maybe tells the wrong story.
What interests me about DUSK is the separation between doing computation privately and proving afterward that the result was correct. Homomorphic encryption can protect the computation itself, while zero-knowledge proofs verify correctness without exposing everything. One does not fully replace the other, thats the part I missed before.
This makes Hedger feel less like a normal throughput problem. Maybe the better metric is proof-generation time / financial value settled, or even € settled per proof.
For DUSK Network confidential throughput probably need two measurements: computational load and economic value.
A million transfers can look huge. But one complex institutional proof might carry more real dependency than all of them combined, and thats where the harder question starts.
At first I assumed yes, because more transactions should mean more work. But that starts looking too simple once private computation enters the picture.
A €20 transfer and a €20 million hedging action may both become “one transaction” on a dashboard, yet the second could involve far more encrypted state, proof generation and financial dependency. So TPS alone maybe tells the wrong story.
What interests me about DUSK is the separation between doing computation privately and proving afterward that the result was correct. Homomorphic encryption can protect the computation itself, while zero-knowledge proofs verify correctness without exposing everything. One does not fully replace the other, thats the part I missed before.
This makes Hedger feel less like a normal throughput problem. Maybe the better metric is proof-generation time / financial value settled, or even € settled per proof.
For DUSK Network confidential throughput probably need two measurements: computational load and economic value.
A million transfers can look huge. But one complex institutional proof might carry more real dependency than all of them combined, and thats where the harder question starts.