A fellow groupmate asked me: what exactly does the Security execution domain of the Newton Protocol block? I went through the Newton Protocol Mainnet Beta myself. Hexagate, as a security partner, is integrated to perform real-time threat scanning before transaction settlement—flash loan attacks, sandwich attacks, oracle price manipulation. If the strategy threshold is triggered, it gets intercepted, leaving on-chain proof. In 2024, Hexagate participated in the remediation of 5,000+ on-chain threat events. My first reaction: useful—really pushed the line of defense forward by one layer. #Newt
But there’s one part I’ve never managed to fully wrap my head around. Hexagate’s threat recognition is trained from historical attack data. The issue is that the on-chain behavioral features of flash-loan arbitrage and flash-loan attacks in those few hundred milliseconds before settlement are sometimes so similar that even automated systems can struggle to distinguish them. If your arbitrage strategy is mistakenly flagged as a threat, the transaction gets rejected before settlement—on-chain you only get a single "policy rejection" and no reason is given, no appeal channel, and no compensation mechanism. And whoever has the details of the current attack feature database has an early advantage in evading it—this in itself is an information asymmetry vulnerability. @NewtonProtocol
My conclusion is simple: for people who only do normal LP and don’t touch active strategies, the Security execution domain is pure protection for you, no need to dig deeper. But if you’re doing on-chain arbitrage, flash-loan synthesis, or moving funds across protocols, before you connect to Newton’s vault, first make sure whether that security policy has a measurable false positive rate and a revision/appeal mechanism—otherwise it’s basically handing over the authority to decide whether "my transaction is valid".
On the $NEWT side, I only watch one number: the actual number of interception requests from the Security layer. That’s evidence of real calls, more indicative than the list of partners. For on-chain security interceptions and transaction review, where do you think the boundaries are? Anyway, that’s where I stand—I haven’t found a good answer to this question. #newt $NEWT
But there’s one part I’ve never managed to fully wrap my head around. Hexagate’s threat recognition is trained from historical attack data. The issue is that the on-chain behavioral features of flash-loan arbitrage and flash-loan attacks in those few hundred milliseconds before settlement are sometimes so similar that even automated systems can struggle to distinguish them. If your arbitrage strategy is mistakenly flagged as a threat, the transaction gets rejected before settlement—on-chain you only get a single "policy rejection" and no reason is given, no appeal channel, and no compensation mechanism. And whoever has the details of the current attack feature database has an early advantage in evading it—this in itself is an information asymmetry vulnerability. @NewtonProtocol
My conclusion is simple: for people who only do normal LP and don’t touch active strategies, the Security execution domain is pure protection for you, no need to dig deeper. But if you’re doing on-chain arbitrage, flash-loan synthesis, or moving funds across protocols, before you connect to Newton’s vault, first make sure whether that security policy has a measurable false positive rate and a revision/appeal mechanism—otherwise it’s basically handing over the authority to decide whether "my transaction is valid".
On the $NEWT side, I only watch one number: the actual number of interception requests from the Security layer. That’s evidence of real calls, more indicative than the list of partners. For on-chain security interceptions and transaction review, where do you think the boundaries are? Anyway, that’s where I stand—I haven’t found a good answer to this question. #newt $NEWT