首席交易大师-小刀
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The sky has fallen, and 8 million USDT is gone.
At 2 AM, Old Li called, his voice trembling: "It wasn't stolen; I was using a cold wallet, the private key wasn’t leaked, the mnemonic was written on paper, and I’ve never taken a picture, how could it possibly be lost?"
But on-chain data ruthlessly shows: 8 million was not 'stolen', but rather disappeared after he personally clicked 'agree'.
Old Li has been in the circle for five or six years, priding himself as the 'most cautious old investor'. Before this incident, he just wanted to make things easier—he installed a browser extension wallet that connected to his Ledger cold wallet.
The interface was simple, capable of syncing with the cold wallet, and was recommended by the community, looking quite 'legitimate'.
He felt it was 'just for viewing', with no risks.
At the moment of connection, he clicked 'authorize signature' once. It was this step that granted all asset transfer permissions to the hacker.
The truth restored:
What he signed was the 'SetApprovalForAll' standard contract.
The authorized party was the pooled contract deployed by the hacker.
Three days later, the cold wallet received 8 million USDT.
The hacker didn't need to confirm, directly calling the contract to transfer all the balance at once.
No notifications on the phone, the wallet only left a 'call event'.
Old Li didn't click 'transfer', but that authorization was like an already signed blank check; the other party could take it without needing to ask him again.
Tracking the contract call path and authorization source
Marking the victim's address and interaction parties
Extracting the flow of funds, confirming the pooled wallet and exchange
Issuing a judicial report and communicating across platforms to freeze
Currently, part of the funds have been frozen at the exchange.
The lesson is harsh:
Old Li was not careless, but rather too trusting of the 'absolute security' of cold wallets. The hacker did not use brute force but instead exploited each step of 'seemingly safe' operations, slowly pushing the person into a trap.
In the on-chain world, the scariest thing is not that you clicked on transfer, but that you don't know when you've already given away ownership.
At 2 AM, Old Li called, his voice trembling: "It wasn't stolen; I was using a cold wallet, the private key wasn’t leaked, the mnemonic was written on paper, and I’ve never taken a picture, how could it possibly be lost?"
But on-chain data ruthlessly shows: 8 million was not 'stolen', but rather disappeared after he personally clicked 'agree'.
Old Li has been in the circle for five or six years, priding himself as the 'most cautious old investor'. Before this incident, he just wanted to make things easier—he installed a browser extension wallet that connected to his Ledger cold wallet.
The interface was simple, capable of syncing with the cold wallet, and was recommended by the community, looking quite 'legitimate'.
He felt it was 'just for viewing', with no risks.
At the moment of connection, he clicked 'authorize signature' once. It was this step that granted all asset transfer permissions to the hacker.
The truth restored:
What he signed was the 'SetApprovalForAll' standard contract.
The authorized party was the pooled contract deployed by the hacker.
Three days later, the cold wallet received 8 million USDT.
The hacker didn't need to confirm, directly calling the contract to transfer all the balance at once.
No notifications on the phone, the wallet only left a 'call event'.
Old Li didn't click 'transfer', but that authorization was like an already signed blank check; the other party could take it without needing to ask him again.
Tracking the contract call path and authorization source
Marking the victim's address and interaction parties
Extracting the flow of funds, confirming the pooled wallet and exchange
Issuing a judicial report and communicating across platforms to freeze
Currently, part of the funds have been frozen at the exchange.
The lesson is harsh:
Old Li was not careless, but rather too trusting of the 'absolute security' of cold wallets. The hacker did not use brute force but instead exploited each step of 'seemingly safe' operations, slowly pushing the person into a trap.
In the on-chain world, the scariest thing is not that you clicked on transfer, but that you don't know when you've already given away ownership.
Disclaimer: Includes third-party opinions. No financial advice. May include sponsored content. See T&Cs.
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