Without further ado, let's get straight to the point. For ease of reading, we will refer to the buyers of U as Parties A, B, C, D, and the sellers as Parties E, F, G, H.
Scheme One
Party B posted a message on an overseas chat application seeking to buy U. After seeing it, Party A proactively contacted them, and they agreed on a time and place for an offline transaction. When Party A arrived, they found that the person for the transaction was Party B, who informed Party A through the app that they had a last-minute issue and sent Party C to handle it. Party A was instructed to first transfer U to Party B, who would then pay Party A in cash. However, after Party A transferred the U as instructed, Party B denied receiving it, and Party C also refused to pay cash.
Scheme Two
Party B posted a message on an overseas chat application seeking to buy U. After seeing it, Party A proactively contacted them, and they agreed on a time and place for an offline transaction. When Party A arrived, they found multiple people including Party B. Party B claimed to be just an intermediary, and the real buyers were other parties, instructing Party A to transfer U to the addresses provided by them. After Party A transferred the U, the other parties immediately claimed they hadn't received it, even saying the U "got lost," and quickly left the scene, leaving Party A arguing with Party B.
Scheme Three
Party B and Party A agreed to conduct an offline transaction of U. When Party A arrived, they first verified Party B's funds and confirmed everything was correct. Just as they were about to proceed with the transaction, Party B expressed concerns about the U being problematic and requested Party A to download a "detection software" (via a QR code or DApp installation). After Party A downloaded and operated according to the prompts, the software indicated that there were issues with the U. Party B then refused to proceed with the transaction on these grounds. Later, Party A discovered that the U in their wallet had been stolen but could not prove that this detection software was installed at Party B's request.
Scheme Four
Party B saw Party A selling U on a chat application at a suitable price, so they agreed to a face-to-face transaction. When Party B arrived, Party A was absent and instead sent a third party, Party C, to act on their behalf. After verifying Party B's funds, Party B sent their U address to Party A. Shortly after, Party A sent a screenshot showing the U was transferred successfully, and Party C immediately took Party B's money. However, in reality, Party B never received the U.
Scheme Five
Party B and Party A agreed to conduct an offline transaction of U. After Party B arrived, they found that Party A was absent, and instead, Parties C and D were present. Party B, being cautious, asked to verify U first. After confirming everything was correct, Party A then wanted to verify Party B's funds. During the verification process, Parties C and D took control of Party B's money. Party A transferred "fake U" (non-compliant U not issued by a legitimate company) to a certain address, claiming it was provided by Party B, but Party B had already deleted their chat records, making it impossible to prove. Ultimately, Parties C and D refused to return the money to Party B.
Scheme Six
Party B met Party A through an overseas transaction app, and their previous transactions had gone smoothly, so Party A trusted Party B. After the "924 notification" was issued, Party B claimed that online transactions were not safe and suggested switching to offline transactions, agreeing on a time and place. When Party A arrived, they found Party C instead of Party B, who was absent for various reasons. After Party A verified the funds and transferred U as instructed by Party B, Party B denied receiving it and deleted their chat records. Party C quickly fled with the money. Even if Party A reported to the police and Party C was caught, Party C claimed to be unaware of the entire transaction and there were no chat or call records between Party A and Party C.
Scheme Seven
Party B and Party A met through an overseas trading software and agreed to an offline transaction of U. On the day of the transaction, after Party A verified Party B's funds, Party B sent the U address through the app. After Party A transferred according to the address, Party B claimed not to have received it. Upon checking the chat records, Party A found that the address previously sent by Party B had been retracted, and Party B sent another address, subsequently refusing to make payment.
Scheme Eight
Party A and Party B agreed to conduct an offline transaction of U. Party B was very enthusiastic and booked a hotel for Party A in advance. After checking in, Party A connected to the hotel WiFi, and soon after, the U in the wallet disappeared.
Scheme Nine
Party B and Party A agreed to conduct an offline transaction of U. Upon arrival, Party B found that there were several other parties present. Party B became cautious and requested to verify the U first. After confirming everything was correct, Party A's side then requested to verify Party B's funds. During the verification process, the other parties controlled Party B's money. Party A transferred "fake U" (non-compliant U not issued by a legitimate company) to a certain address, claiming it was provided by Party B, but Party B had already deleted their chat records, making it impossible to prove. Ultimately, the other parties refused to return the money to Party B.
Scheme Ten
Party B and Party A agreed to conduct an offline transaction of U. Due to the large amount, according to the rules, U should be transferred first before payment. To be cautious, Party A requested to conduct the transaction in batches, which Party B agreed to. The first few transactions went smoothly, and Party A gradually let their guard down. During a large transaction, Party B found various excuses to postpone and refused to pay in cash.
Scheme Eleven
Party B had multiple transactions with Party A and obtained Party A's bank account number. They agreed to conduct an offline transaction but still used bank transfer for payment (this is when one should be more cautious). Party B took out a pre-faked video, pretended to conduct the transfer, and showed it to Party A. Party A only noticed that the account and name were theirs and didn't look at other information, then transferred the U to Party B. Later on, Party A discovered that the money was not received, and all related chat records had been deleted by Party B.
