The United States took a hardline stance in the third round of negotiations, clearly rejecting the comprehensive removal of the 25% tariff on Japanese cars and parts, and only agreeing to discuss reducing tariffs on certain goods, such as the 24% 'reciprocal tariff.' Officials from Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry pointed out that over 30% of the approximately $67 billion U.S. trade deficit with Japan in 2024 is attributed to automobiles, with U.S. tariffs being used as a pressure tool to force Japan to make concessions in other areas. The lifeline of the automotive industry: automobile exports account for 30% of Japan's total exports to the U.S.; if tariffs are not lowered, annual losses for automakers such as Toyota and Honda may exceed $10 billion. With the Senate elections approaching, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party faces pressure from the July elections and needs to avoid angering the agricultural cooperative, one of Japan's largest voting blocs, due to concessions in agriculture, instead opting to compromise on automobile tariffs. Japan previously used multilateral frameworks like the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) to balance U.S. unilateral pressure, but after the Trump administration withdrew from the TPP, Japan was forced to return to bilateral negotiations with limited leverage. Japan may accept a reduction of the U.S. tariff on automobiles and parts from 25% to 10%-15%, but only in exchange for expanding U.S. agricultural imports (such as corn and soybeans). This move could provoke protests from domestic agricultural groups, but the losses compared to the automotive industry are more manageable. Non-tariff measures and economic cooperation: Charging station subsidies: Japan plans to provide subsidies for Tesla's Supercharger stations, originally only supporting the domestic standard CHAdeMO, in exchange for the U.S. easing automotive tariffs. Shipbuilding and energy cooperation: Japan proposed joint research and development in the shipbuilding sector and increasing imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas to diversify negotiation focuses. The reverse input strategy has failed: Japan previously attempted to balance trade deficits by importing American-made Japanese cars, but low demand and high costs made it ineffective. Technical concessions pose risks: If tariffs are only reduced and not eliminated, Japanese automakers will still bear additional costs, which will weaken competitiveness in the long term. Under U.S.-China competition, Japan and South Korea's choices: Japan's shift to a 'tariff reduction' strategy may prompt South Korea to follow suit. South Korea's semiconductor exports have been harmed by U.S. tariffs, accelerating cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea in regional supply chains and 'de-dollarization' payment systems to hedge against U.S. unilateralism risks. The repositioning of CPTPP and RCEP: Japan's dominance in multilateral frameworks may be weakened due to compromises with the U.S., but it can maintain autonomous discourse on rules by strengthening cooperation with ASEAN and China to seek balance.