The biggest narrative right now is that stablecoins + tokenization of US stocks have emerged.


Let me start with a bold statement:
The stablecoin bill is likely to be successfully implemented, and Trump's historical status may very well sit at the same table as Roosevelt and Reagan.
Because Trump, through the 'decentralization revolution' of digital currency, has reclaimed monetary sovereignty for the US government from bankers.

Currently, there are three versions of this bill:
The House version is H.R. 2392, which has been submitted to the full committee awaiting a vote;
The Senate draft is S. 394, and the revised version passed on June 17 is S. 1582.

The original English texts, Chinese translations, and my organized key provisions interpretations of these three versions have already been published in my knowledge community. Interested friends can check it out.

The following is an interpretation based on the latest version S.1582.
The entire bill is divided into ten chapters, each clearly corresponding to a specific institutional function.
Starting from the first chapter, which establishes legislative purposes and defines terms, it is clear that this bill aims to protect consumers, maintain the stability of the payment system, and encourage compliant innovation. The subsequent chapters—from compliant issuance, reserve custody, regulatory auditing, consumer protection to technology and security provisions—almost constitute a complete 'regulatory foundation for digital payment currency'.

Clearly, we believe that the vast majority of the audience are not interested in detailed policy interpretations. Let's jump straight into the case.

Let’s assume there is a fintech company, whose actual owner is Trump, preparing to issue its own stablecoin named 'Trump Coin'. The vision is simple: just like using your Alipay balance, you can transfer, shop, and withdraw Trump Coins anytime.

So how can it legally issue Trump Coins?
The process is actually not complicated:
Step one, it must apply for a license in a 'reliable' state—not just any state, but one where the regulatory system must pass the 'equivalence certification' of the US Treasury. For example, Florida has established a dedicated regulatory system for stablecoins and has been recognized by the federal Treasury, so the company can start from there.

Step two, it must ensure that every Trump Coin is backed by equivalent reserve assets. The bill states that these reserves can be US dollars, US Treasury bonds maturing within 90 days, or government-approved high liquidity money market funds. This money must be held in trust by a third party, dedicated for this purpose, reconciled daily, and prohibited from being mixed, invested, or pledged. Bitcoin, altcoins, corporate bonds, and equity assets are all disqualified.

Step three, the company must commit to allowing the public to exchange Trump Coins for US dollars at a 1:1 ratio at any time, with instant payment during working days, without charging fees, setting thresholds, or paying interest, ensuring it is a payment tool rather than an investment product.

Step four, it must accept regulatory audits. It must publicly disclose the total amount issued, reserve scale, and custody structure monthly, and undergo auditing by a third-party registered accounting firm. The CEO and CFO must sign off on the reports, and if they commit fraud, they will face criminal liability.

Step five, establish a clear user protection mechanism. Customer service channels, complaint handling mechanisms, and emergency withdrawal processes must be established, and prominently state on the app and website: Trump Coin is not government-backed, nor is it insured by FDIC, and users must assess their own risks.

So what happens if something goes wrong?
If there is a panic for withdrawals in the market, regulators have the right to immediately access the company's custody account information, and banks must cooperate;
If the system suffers a hacking attack, the company must report the incident and take suspension measures within 48 hours;
If financial fraud is discovered? A light penalty, or the revocation of the license and imprisonment of executives;
If the state loses its 'equivalence certification', the company must accept federal regulatory upgrades or withdraw all user assets;
If users frequently complain about being unable to withdraw, regulators may enforce a deadline for rectification, force the establishment of backup payment channels, and impose penalties as deemed appropriate.
Hearing this, you might say: 'Hey? It sounds... not much different from Alipay or WeChat Pay that we use, right?'

So why does this scheme allow the US government to reclaim monetary sovereignty from bankers?

First, the stablecoin bill clearly empowers the Treasury to review issuer qualifications and set technical and compliance standards, essentially bypassing the Federal Reserve system to establish a currency channel that is 'quasi-fiscal direct to users'.

In the traditional US dollar issuance system, the Federal Reserve is responsible for issuing and recycling base currency, while commercial banks expand broad money through 'special license credit creation' via loans. In other words, the Treasury issues debt for financing but cannot decide 'how to issue money'; it is a 'fund user', not a 'money issuer'.

But in the S.1582 bill, the Treasury Secretary is granted the 'quasi-currency license authority' to decide issuer qualifications. This means the Treasury has the review and access rights to 'create a shadow channel for dollars'. Through the compliant stablecoin path, the Treasury has effectively established a new monetary channel that is 'without credit multiplication but highly controllable', which may become a path for direct fiscal deployment in the future.

To understand this change, we can use an example, assuming the US Treasury has already set up an 'American Sovereign Wealth Fund' to achieve the goal of industrial re-industrialization, such as investing in high-end chip manufacturing and new energy supply chains.

In the past, such investments often had to go through budget allocations, industrial subsidies, or even indirect equity investments, a cumbersome process with many intermediary steps, low efficiency, difficult regulation, and outcomes that could easily be discounted.

But now, if the Treasury has the access rights for stablecoin issuance, it can construct a 'blockchain-based targeted investment, transparent circulation, and closed recovery' quasi-fiscal investment track through this digital channel.

For example, it could authorize a stablecoin issuing institution to issue 'digital dollar tokens' specifically for industrial investment; these tokens are backed by real US dollar reserves of the sovereign fund and directed to specific manufacturing enterprises, only to be used for purchasing equipment, paying for research and development, and introducing talent in compliant scenarios. Every expenditure is traceable on the blockchain, ensuring the funds are used specifically for their intended purpose, not misappropriated or used for financial arbitrage.

More importantly, this system does not rely on commercial banks for loan issuance, nor does it need the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, but rather through technical and institutional design, directly directs the allocation of financial resources to the core sectors of the real economy.

Second, the 'debanking' of the reserve mechanism and the potential expansion of base currency.
The bill stipulates that the 'reserves' behind stablecoins can only sit in accounts without being lent out, invested, or pledged.

This seems like putting shackles on stablecoins, but in fact, it represents a major transfer of power: commercial banks' 'money creation privilege' through the monetary multiplier is restricted, and the dominance of money has shifted from the financial system back to government regulation. This is a 'legal validation + functional reduction' of shadow banking, but a 'power strengthening' for sovereign currency.

As the application scope of stablecoins continues to expand, the demand for redemption will continuously grow, while the reserve mechanism prohibits generating yields.

This means that issuing institutions need to continuously allocate a large amount of highly liquid, risk-free, but not generating substantial interest income assets (such as cash, spot deposits, short-term government bonds), but this type of funding is hard to rely on the commercial banking system, as commercial banks fundamentally depend on reinvesting deposits to achieve positive returns.

The result is: the widespread circulation of stablecoins will significantly increase the direct demand for base currency.

This brings about a long-term impact: while stablecoins compress credit leverage, they may force central banks or the Treasury to issue debt to expand the supply of base currency, driving down yields on short-term government bonds.

Therefore, those who constantly shout 'US debt rates are too high, the US can't hold on much longer' can basically stop. Once the stablecoin system is successfully implemented, US debt will not only not be the root of a crash but will rather be the most needed asset in the entire system.

To put it bluntly—it's not that there are too many US debts, but that there aren't enough.

As long as these debts can spur technology, manufacturing, and infrastructure, they will be the engine of national production, not a fiscal burden.

Debts are not feared to be numerous; what is feared is their misallocation.

Third, finance serves the real economy.
In the traditional system, financial capital achieves monopolistic profits through 'positioning, controlling flow, and extracting interest' from monetary circulation. But the design of the stablecoin bill brings payments back to payments, reserves back to reserves, with transparent paths, closed functions, and no arbitrage space.

This means that the circulation of stablecoins is no longer for capital profits but rather for genuine transactions, production collaborations, and value settlements in the real economy.

Under this mechanism, if financial capital wants to make money, it must assume risks, participate in project investment, and bear cycles. Arbitrageurs exit, and investors enter.

In this system, financial capital no longer monopolizes the right to circulate money from a high position but participates as risk capital in creating real value. This returns finance to serve the real economy instead of becoming a roadblock to it.

Fourth, it is a legally protected compliant currency, but not a sovereign currency endorsed by the state.

In traditional financial logic, large financial institutions leverage deposit insurance and sovereign currency credit endorsements to continuously leverage, cross-marketing, and expand assets, ultimately when risks explode, as long as the financial institution is large enough, has a wide enough operational scope, and a systemically important position, even if they fail in operations, the government often has to step in to bail them out, forming the phenomenon of 'too big to fail'.

However, stablecoins use a whole set of compliant but 'de-endorsement' mechanisms to actively cut off the channel for financial capital to shift risks to public credit:
Not allowed to lend, invest, or arbitrage with reserve assets to prevent 'systemic leverage';

No interest payments, not included in the deposit insurance system, to prevent users from misunderstanding 'implicit guarantees';

No bailouts in case of trouble, regardless of market cap, must withdraw, must penalize, must stop, and absolutely no bailouts.

This 'decentralized institutional design' is a fundamental correction to the 'shadow banking-dominated financial expansion' since the 2008 financial crisis and serves as an institutional immune mechanism to prevent 'finance from hijacking the state'.

Fifth, the combination of digital currency and smart contracts may together constitute a new logic of currency governance in the future.

Digital currency, especially stablecoins operating in conjunction with smart contracts, have a structural attribute of 'program governance':

Every payment can embed rules, permissions, and conditions;
Every stablecoin may bind source explanations, usage labels, and payment deadlines;
Settlement and redemption mechanisms can be executed automatically, and compliance boundaries can be technically solidified.
This is a 'behavioral system' with a naturally embedded governance logic.

For example, a consumer reward issued by a platform can also be written into a contract: automatically reclaimed if not used within 30 days, cannot be transferred, cannot be cashed out. These are scenarios where 'currency behavior' can be controlled through contracts. The change behind this is: when you spend money, you are actually executing a contract task, not freely 'spending money'.

In other words, in the future, money may no longer just be about 'how much you have', but about 'what you can do'. This will give rise to a new logic of currency governance in the future.

Hearing this, you should be able to feel: the stablecoin bill is a systemic innovation that completely disrupts the old financial logic.

It not only reshapes the relationship between currency and regulation, finance and the real economy, credit and responsibility, but may also become a model for future global currency governance.

So don't be fooled by some patriotic influencers, thinking that this thing is useless and won't save the US. As long as we strategically endure and hold our ground, we can wait for 'victory to fall from the sky'.

In the near future, it is very likely that this will backfire due to China's follow-up. (—— Lang Ji)