A hell of a joke
The total value of all airdrops for Anan Alpha so far may not even be as much as the market value lost by $ZKJ in one night.
This is the cruel and real side of the crypto world. The market value of the altcoin $ZKJ plummeted from nearly $2 billion at its peak to less than $200 million in just a few hours, with over 90% of its value evaporating. This is not just a market fluctuation; it feels more like a meticulously planned "hunting" operation targeting high liquidity tokens under the Anan Alpha hotspot.
Three main attacking addresses targeted the massive trading volume and liquidity generated from the "wash trading" of $ZKJ and $KOGE, ultimately leading to a series of flash crashes in the prices of both tokens through a dual strike of "large liquidity withdrawals + continuous sell-offs."
Volatility is the true reward of the market and the sharpest sickle. Tonight, countless LPs (liquidity providers) and holders became the crops that were harvested.
Event breakdown: How did three addresses orchestrate this crash?
This attack was led by at least three core addresses, whose actions were interconnected, precise, and deadly.
Mastermind Address One: 0x1A2...27599
This address played the role of the "pioneer," creating pressure for the subsequent dump by withdrawing liquidity and swapping assets.
20:28 - 20:33: Withdrew 61,130 $KOGE (approximately $3.76 million) and 273,017 $ZKJ (approximately $532,000) from the liquidity pool in two transactions.
20:28 - 20:36: Swapped 45,470 $KOGE for $ZKJ, with a total value of approximately $3.796 million. This significantly increased the on-chain transaction volume of $KOGE, creating a false impression of active trading.
20:30 - 20:59: Started selling $ZKJ in batches, totaling 1.573 million, exchanged for $USDT and $BNB, valued at $3.052 million, with an average selling price of $1.94.
At this stage, although the prices of $KOGE and $ZKJ were experiencing stepwise declines, the market had not yet entered a state of panic crash. This was merely the calm before the storm.
Mastermind Address Two: 0x078...8bdE7
This address is the true "main attacker"; its "relay-style" dumping is key to driving the coin price into freefall.
20:30: Withdraw 33,651 $KOGE (approximately $2.07 million) and 709,203 $ZKJ (approximately $1.38 million) in bilateral liquidity.
20:31 - 20:58: Swap 36,814 $KOGE for $ZKJ, valued at $2.26 million.
20:35 - 20:37: In just two minutes, a concentrated sell-off of 1 million $ZKJ worth $1.948 million occurred, with an average selling price of $1.948.
It was this concentrated and massive sell-off, like a heavy blow, that completely shattered the psychological defense of the market, leading to a series of huge bearish candles on the $KOGE chart, and the crash began.
Mastermind Address Three: 0x6aD...e2EBb
This address acts as a "supporting attacker," playing a role in finishing off and expanding the gains.
20:41: Received 772,759 $ZKJ (worth about $1.5 million at the time) transferred from the "main attacker" (0x078...8bdE7).
20:42 - 20:50: Quickly cleared out the 772,000 $ZKJ in 8 minutes.
The actions of this address further catalyzed the decline of $ZKJ, especially against the backdrop of $KOGE's price crash, completing the final harvesting of both token LPs and holders.
In-depth analysis: Common questions answered
1. Why smash KOGE before attacking ZKJ? This is based on a meticulous strategic consideration:
Short-selling mechanism:$ZKJ has perpetual contracts on centralized exchanges, allowing attackers to open short positions in advance. By smashing the spot market on-chain, they trigger a price crash, thereby obtaining huge profits in the futures market.
Liquidity differences:In contrast, $ZKJ has deeper liquidity, requiring more funds to directly smash it. Therefore, by first breaching the liquidity-poor associated token $KOGE, inducing market panic, and then attacking $ZKJ, they can achieve twice the result with half the effort.
2. Why start acting at 8:30, but the flash crash on the K-line was delayed?
$ZKJ and $KOGE had previously been known for their "stable prices and good liquidity," attracting many LPs seeking stable returns. These LPs usually set their liquidity within a very narrow price range to maximize returns.
The early sell-off by the attacker was merely slowly "consuming" the buy orders within this narrow range.
Once this core support range is breached, the price will fall into a "vacuum zone" without sufficient funds to support it, triggering an inevitable flash crash.
The flash crash further led to panic withdrawals of liquidity by other LPs, forming a death spiral that exacerbated the collapse. Those LPs who didn't manage to escape had their funds passively converted into continuously falling $ZKJ and $KOGE, becoming trapped.
3. Why choose to act tonight?
The exact timing is unknown, but some reasonable speculation can be made:
Declining trading volume:The overall trading volume of Anan Alpha had been declining for several days before the incident, which may indicate a decrease in market enthusiasm and an increased willingness for major holders to exit.
"Running Fast" Game:For whale LPs, exiting is itself a "running game." When they sense risk, they rush to be the first to escape. Once they discover someone has fled, all kinds of whale alarms go off, and they scramble to escape at any cost.
Lack of believers:Most holders of $ZKJ and $KOGE are miners who came for high interest in a "mine and sell" strategy, rather than long-term believers. This fragile consensus means the collapse of the building only requires the breaking of one load-bearing pillar.
Finally, data from a certain exchange provides a footnote for this crash: within a short minute at 20:57, the exchange recorded 6 transactions over a million dollars and dozens of transactions between $100,000 to a million dollars of $ZKJUSDT long positions being forcibly liquidated. These liquidation orders fueled the fire, delivering the final blow to this epic crash.
Data in this article comes from AI Aunt.
