⚡️ Friends, Ethereum is being drained by L2, becoming merely a tool, while the value of the security layer is gradually weakened.
L2 is making a huge profit, taking all the fees, MEV, and liquidity, while Ethereum stakers can only watch. This model is indeed a bit distorted; Ethereum provides security, yet L2 pays almost no rent and enjoys the benefits.
For example, Base earned 2.5 million dollars last month but gave Ethereum less than 11,000 dollars; Optimism is outrageous, earning 321 dollars for itself for every 1 dollar paid to Ethereum. Doesn’t this model sound wrong?
This asymmetrical distribution of profits means Ethereum is working for L2 with its own security value. Not to mention the future EIP-4844 upgrade (which reduces L1 data costs through blobs) could further lower Ethereum's L1 fees, making the situation worse.
The prosperity of L2 certainly cannot be separated from Ethereum's security backing, but the fees they pay and the profits they make are completely disproportionate. Over time, Ethereum's economic incentives will be weakened, and its core position may be shaken, becoming a foolish security layer while L2 continues to thrive. This situation is obviously unsustainable.
To change the current situation, Ethereum must take proactive measures to ensure that it can benefit from the prosperity of L2. How to do it? Here are a few ideas:
1. ETH Staking Deposit: Require L2 sequencers to stake a certain amount of ETH as collateral to participate in network activities. This not only enhances L2's security contribution to Ethereum but also extends Ethereum's security to all L2 through a re-staking mechanism.
2. Settlement Fee Sharing: Specify that a portion of L2 transaction fees (e.g., 5-10%) directly belongs to Ethereum stakers, or establish an ETH treasury where L2 contributes tokens or fees to fill this treasury, serving as the financial layer of the L2 ecosystem.
3. MEV Redistribution: The MEV (Miner Extractable Value) generated by L2 (such as additional profits from transaction ordering) should flow back to the Ethereum network to enhance L1's economic incentives. For instance, a portion of MEV earnings should be allocated to Ethereum validators through smart contract mechanisms.
4. Rent Mechanism: Introduce the concept of rent that needs to be paid for L2, which can be calculated based on L2's transaction volume, TVL (Total Value Locked), or user activity, ensuring that Ethereum receives reasonable returns. For example, Base can pay rent based on 10% of its revenue monthly.
The implementation of these measures needs to balance L2's profitability with Ethereum's sustainable development. For example, mandatory ETH staking may increase L2's operating costs, while fee sharing needs to consider user experience and L2's competitiveness.
The following is a comparison of some L2's L1 fees and estimated L2 revenues from February 16 to March 17, 2025 (based on L2Beat data and assuming L2 execution fees account for 10% of total fees):
Currently, the relationship between L2 and Ethereum is indeed asymmetrical; L2 relies on Ethereum's security, yet the fees paid do not proportionately match its profits, putting Ethereum at risk of becoming a tool. L2 is highly profitable but contributes insufficiently to Ethereum, threatening its long-term sustainability.
Now is the window for Ethereum to counterattack. If not acted upon, it may be marginalized by L2; if done correctly, it can maintain its position, increase returns, and strengthen its ecosystem. L2 doesn’t have to change its entire model, but Ethereum must toughen up, set rules, and collect returns, making L2 pay for security value; otherwise, the day when Rollup takes the lead is not far off.