In the "7・29" cross-border fraud case supervised by the Ministry of Public Security, the "Bori" group based in the Golden Triangle of Laos used virtual currency investment as bait, involving over 50 million yuan, and ultimately more than 60 people were sentenced. The logic of handling this case has great reference value for the evidence collection, responsibility division, and recovery of losses in similar cross-border fraud cases.
From the perspective of evidence construction, the prosecution agency compared the codenames of the co-defendants with the transcripts and dug deep into electronic data, creating a criminal map with a 4-layer structure and 17 business groups. They also used the "deposit table" (which records the time, amount, and employee codes of the fraud) to lock in performance, forming a complete chain of evidence - this provides a model for solving the challenges of "difficulties in obtaining evidence abroad and chaotic personnel relationships." In terms of responsibility division, the court sentenced based on the hierarchy of "financial backer - shareholder - group leader - employee," with the principal offender Chen receiving a sentence of more than ten years, while 13 related personnel who crossed the border were also held accountable, clarifying the principle of joint punishment for "fraud + related crimes."
Recently, as another batch of fraud gang members was transferred to the Zhongxiang City Procuratorate in Hubei Province for review and prosecution, new phased results were achieved in the '7·29' major cross-border telecommunications network fraud series case supervised by the Ministry of Public Security. As of now, more than 60 defendants in this series of cases have been sentenced, involving fraud amounts exceeding 50 million yuan.
1. Investment scams expose a large cross-border fraud gang
In November 2021, Zhongxiang citizen Zheng was lured by a friend on WeChat and downloaded an investment financial app through a link provided by the other party, investing in virtual currency under their guidance. Tempted by the small profits in the early stages and successful withdrawals, Zheng invested over 300,000 yuan, only to realize he had fallen into a scam trap when he found he could not withdraw. He subsequently reported the case to the public security organs.
After preliminary assessments, the public security organs believe this is a cross-border telecommunications network fraud case, with the direct implementation of the scam based in the Golden Triangle Economic Zone of Laos. As the investigation deepened, a cross-border fraud group named 'Borui' gradually came to light.
Due to the multiple difficulties in evidence collection overseas, chaotic personnel relations, and complicated fund flows, in August 2022, the Zhongxiang City Procuratorate intervened according to law to guide the investigation and evidence collection.
“The criminal suspects use codenames to conceal their identities, making it difficult to outline the organizational structure of the criminal group. If this key point cannot be clarified, subsequent crackdowns are mere talk.” During the legal intervention in the investigation, the case prosecutors reviewed over 100 volumes of files page by page, proposing evidence collection opinions around three core issues: 'criminal group structure, fund flow, personnel relations,' promoting a comprehensive clarification of the composition and organizational structure of the criminal group, laying a solid foundation for the subsequent precise crackdown on criminals at all levels.
2. Organize the structure to solidify the evidence foundation
As the investigation gradually progressed, the outline of the 'Borui' large cross-border fraud group became clearer. This large cross-border fraud group, born in the Golden Triangle Economic Zone of Laos, was jointly funded by Chen from Fujian and his partners. After multiple rounds of internal personnel reshuffling, a tight system was formed: the top-level 'financial backer' operates behind the scenes, upper-level 'shareholders' command from the front, middle-level 'group leaders' manage separately, and lower-level 'employees' are responsible for specific implementations. The fraud group also has well-established functional departments for personnel administration, finance, technology, customer service, etc., and multiple business groups, forming a complete chain of cross-border telecommunications network fraud.
“They often disguise themselves as industry elites around 30 years old, carefully selecting potential targets through various social software.” The case prosecutors introduced that this fraud group operates with centralized accommodation and unified management; all members undergo strict training, and after gradually establishing a trust relationship with the victims, they lure them into false investment platforms with 'small profits,' manipulating rises and falls through the platform, limiting withdrawals, and quickly transferring and laundering the stolen funds through underground banks after success.
To thoroughly understand the internal structure of this fraud group and achieve a full-chain crackdown on crime, the case prosecutors repeatedly compared the codenames of co-defendants with transcripts, combined with key evidence such as electronic data, ultimately locking in the corresponding relationships at each level and creating a crime network diagram covering a 4-level organizational structure, 5 functional departments, and 17 business groups. This diagram became the 'navigation map' for subsequent precise sentencing.
In December 2022, the case entered the review and prosecution stage, and new difficulties followed: In the early stages of investigation, only 4 victims were identified, which was severely inconsistent with the large scale of the fraud group, with most involved amounts relying solely on one-sided statements. “If the current evidence is followed, the sentencing for the vast majority of criminal suspects does not match the degree of harm caused by the criminal acts of this large cross-border fraud group,” the case prosecutors told reporters.
To solidify the evidence foundation, the procuratorial office returned supplementary investigations to the public security organs, proposed 90 supplementary investigation opinions, and successfully linked three fraud cases through methods such as organizing co-defendant identifications and analyzing related cases. With the incorporation of evidence from related cases, the evidence network of the entire crime chain became tighter. By deeply mining the electronic data of this case, the case prosecutors guided the public security organs to extract the key evidence of the case—the 'capital input table' of the members of this criminal group, which clearly recorded the time, amount, employee codenames, and other situations of the fraud group’s deception of victims’ funds. Subsequently, the prosecutors organized the criminal suspects to identify the 'performance' of the members in the 'capital input table,' forming a closed loop of evidence for the entire crime chain. In January of this year, the Zhongxiang City Procuratorate filed a public prosecution, and the main offenders, including Chen, were sentenced to more than ten years in prison.
3. Extending the crackdown to leave no 'fish that slips through the net'
During the case review process, the case prosecutors discovered that there were multiple criminal suspects not listed in the public security organs' request for approval of arrest, and these individuals had been involved in fraudulent activities in the Golden Triangle Economic Zone of Laos from November 2019 to May 2022.
“The entire chain must be attacked; we must target the 'main trunk' and not neglect the 'branches.' We not only need to combat telecommunications network fraud crimes themselves but also cut off the 'cross-border personnel' supply chain.” In this regard, the Zhongxiang City Procuratorate promptly issued a recommendation letter for the arrest of criminal suspects and a supplementary transfer prosecution notice to the public security organs, correcting the omission of 11 people and 9 people in the prosecution. At the same time, regarding some criminal suspects deliberately avoiding the situation of illegally crossing the national (border) boundary, the case prosecutors conducted focused questioning on their process of going abroad, combining massive electronic data to thoroughly investigate their entry and exit trajectories, confirming the fact that 13 people illegally crossed the national (border) boundary, and promptly supervising the public security organs to file a case for investigation. Currently, the aforementioned criminal suspects have all been sentenced.
“Many victims have lost their life savings, and recovering stolen funds is their most urgent hope.” In this regard, during the case review period, the procuratorial authorities made recovering stolen funds for victims a work priority. The case prosecutors classified and graded the criminal suspects according to their roles in the criminal group, such as 'financial backer,' 'shareholder,' 'group leader,' and 'employee,' delineating sentencing levels respectively. For those actively returning stolen funds, leniency recommendations were made in accordance with the law, while strict penalties were imposed on those who refused to return the stolen funds. Currently, 32 people have voluntarily returned stolen funds.
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