Being in hell and still giving birth, isn't that just doing evil?

China's birth rate has plummeted to a record low. What is happening to the former 'population giant' now? Are young people shrinking back and unwilling to have children? (Background: The fall of a high-ranking executive in China: addiction to cryptocurrency trading, family destruction, and now reduced to driving a taxi to repay debts.) (Additional context: Chinese state media pessimistically reports on the instability of US stablecoins: Circle's IPO bubble, and potential decoupling due to US debt defaults.) In recent years, China's negative population growth situation has become increasingly severe. Despite efforts to stop the bleeding, various local governments have significantly relaxed marriage registration restrictions, opened up China's two-child policy, and even directly provided cash subsidies to encourage young families to have children, they have still been unable to reverse the avalanche of declining birth rates. Why are young people in China now unwilling to reproduce within just a few years of such a V-shaped turn? The demographic dividend is in crisis: why is encouraging childbirth ineffective? China's economic growth has historically relied on a vast labor force, but the impact of declining birth rates has now spread to the labor market and social welfare system. Why do the younger generation generally lack confidence in the future, preferring to 'lie flat' rather than enter marriage and parenthood? A study published in Sage Journals bluntly states: 'High childcare costs and pressure from housing prices have discouraged many young families even before they step into marriage.' Policies have been continuously introduced, yet the collective choice to 'not have children' remains unchanged, indicating that the issue cannot be solved merely by subsidies. Economic pressure: Housing prices and educational costs are a double whammy. According to research, economic pressure is the primary reason. After estimating the cost of raising a child, the expenses for urban families on preschool education, after-school classes, and medical care for children aged 0-6 already account for nearly 40% of disposable income, easily consuming the cash savings of young parents. Moreover, these expenses will continue to rise as the child grows, until they reach the stage of work and marriage, with costs that are unimaginable. Another more realistic factor is housing prices. (Wikipedia) Data compiled from the population entry shows that housing price-to-income ratios in China's first-tier cities have long remained in double digits, often requiring ten years to save for a down payment. The Think Global Health report also warns that slowing income growth exacerbates the anxiety of 'income growth not keeping up with price increases', making having children seen as an added risk rather than a blessing. Subsidy comparison: China’s amounts are scattered, while Taiwan has a complete system. To boost the birth rate, many provinces and cities in China have promoted one-time childcare subsidies, monthly childcare allowances, and extended maternity leave, and have adopted direct transfers to reduce administrative friction. However, reports from Frontiers in Pharmacology in July and a policy list compiled by China Daily's Hong Kong edition on July 11 both point out that the subsidy amounts generally range between 3,000 to 10,000 yuan, which is just a 'drop in the bucket' compared to the hundreds of thousands needed for raising a child. The days of paternity leave vary by region, ranging from 7 to 30 days, making it difficult to institutionalize male caregiving responsibilities. In contrast, Taiwan manages through a unified system of national health insurance and social welfare. Maternity leave is 56 days, and paternity leave is 5 days, both fully paid. The monthly childcare allowance for children aged 0-6 starts at 5,000 New Taiwan dollars, along with public childcare and kindergarten tuition subsidies. Although the benefits are better, they still have not swayed young couples. Women's choices: Education enhancement brings different life paths. The third force comes from the rapid increase in women's self-awareness. An analysis by Number Analytics in July showed that women's access to higher education and labor participation rates have risen simultaneously, making career development and independent living their core goals. UCL's research adds that although maternal leave can be extended to a year in China, the short paternity leave results in childcare responsibilities still largely falling on mothers, deepening the conflict between work and family. Many interviewed women admit to feeling resistant to becoming 'super mothers'. The Think Global Health report further points out that when household chores and childcare responsibilities are unequally distributed, and promotion opportunities are affected, women are more likely to postpone or even give up having children. This choice is no longer a minority case but a collective action among urban middle-class women, indicating that traditional family models are loosening. In summary, the collapse of China's fertility rate is not a short-term fluctuation but the result of intertwined economic pressures, insufficient policies, and changing gender roles. Experiences from both sides of the strait show that simply increasing subsidies cannot reverse the trend; the real key lies in reducing education and housing costs, strengthening public childcare, and establishing gender-friendly workplaces. Only when young people believe they can 'afford to have children, raise them, and share the burden with others' will the population curve have a chance to stop falling and rise again.