💲🕳️Intel has uncovered a high-level embezzlement scheme worth over $842,000 involving ex-employee Natalia Avtsin and former component supplier Yafim Tsibolevsky. Between October 2023 and November 2024, the duo allegedly manipulated internal procurement systems to reroute payments for phantom “services” under a fake supplier name: Energy Electronics 2000.

The method? Avtsin approved inflated quotes from Tsibolevsky, then altered transaction records—reclassifying hardware purchases as “services” to bypass Intel’s stricter audit rules. Service payments didn’t require receipts or proof of delivery, making the channel perfect for internal fraud. To avoid detection, Tsibolevsky issued over 30 micro-invoices, each under $20,000—Avtsin’s approval limit—allowing the scheme to remain hidden for more than a year.

Intel says the fraud extended beyond the pair. A third-party proxy, Levonon Kogan, processed payments despite not being an authorized Intel vendor—suggesting additional systemic failures. Though Kogan hasn’t been accused of wrongdoing, the volume of suspicious orders ($561,000) hints at serious due diligence gaps.

The case exposes a major flaw in corporate payment architectures: classification manipulation. When insiders know which labels deactivate controls, entire systems become irrelevant. In a blockchain environment with immutable audit trails, such fraud would’ve left visible traces—but in legacy finance, it took Intel months to notice.

Intel is now suing both individuals in Haifa District Court, seeking full restitution. But the real question isn’t just about the missing funds—it’s whether other tech giants are vulnerable to the same internal attack vector.

If this can happen inside Intel’s own procurement matrix, what’s protecting the rest of Web2 from its own insiders?#AMAGE