Shock! SUI rushed to freeze hackers, at the cost of "complete centralization"?

Recently, SUI encountered a major issue: in response to a hacking attack, SUI quickly activated the pre-built blacklist feature and directly froze malicious addresses. This mechanism is inherently supported by on-chain nodes; once the blacklist is updated, the nodes will refuse to execute related transactions, effectively resulting in a "full network ban".

But who can modify the blacklist? Although theoretically every node can choose freely, in practice, updates are coordinated and uniformly issued by the SUI official, and everyone follows suit. It appears decentralized, but in reality, it is a unified control.

Even more explosive is that SUI urgently launched a whitelist patch: as long as a transaction is included in the list, it can bypass all security checks, including signatures, permissions, bans, etc., with the goal of being able to "special approve" fund return transactions in the future.

However, to actually transfer the hacker's assets, two major conditions must be met:

Obtain the private key;

Or deploy a "restoration module" with system-level permissions and then enforce it through the whitelist.

In summary: To ensure fund security, SUI has begun to embark on a deeper path of centralization.

The hacker's money has not yet been recovered, and the chain's concept of "decentralization" has already sacrificed half of itself.