In 2006, software engineer Michal Pospieszalski identified critical vulnerabilities in U.S. voting machines that still pose risks today. Tasked by the Election Science Institute, he examined the iVotronic system from Election Systems & Software (ES&S) and found serious issues, including poor coding practices and a lack of end-to-end cryptographic proofs. Pospieszalski highlighted that without these proofs, machines cannot verify the legitimacy of ballots, making them susceptible to manipulation. He proposed a solution based on cryptographic techniques developed by David Chaum, which would allow for anonymous yet verifiable voting. His model suggests implementing three counts: paper ballots, digital tallies, and a cryptographic count to detect discrepancies. Despite the potential for improved security, Pospieszalski noted that entrenched systems and corporate resistance hinder the adoption of these solutions. He advocates for legislative mandates to ensure future voting systems incorporate these cryptographic proofs, aiming to restore trust in elections, especially during contentious periods. Read more AI-generated news on: https://app.chaingpt.org/news